THE SWEEPING-CLAIMS EXCEPTION AND
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
FREDERICK C. Moss*

Every trial lawyer and judge is familiar with the hoary rule of evidence that prohibits a litigant from using extrinsic evidence to impeach
a witness on a collateral matter. Despite the obvious difficulties in defining the terms "collateral," "extrinsic," and "impeach," the rule has
long been recognized as valuable in regulating the scope of impeach-

ment. This article examines the meaning and scope of the collateralmatter rule and the development of an exception to the rule. This ex-

ception, which recently has gained acceptance in most courts, permits
the introduction of extrinsic evidence to rebut sweeping claims or denials that a witness makes on direct examination, even though the testimony to be contradicted relates to a collateral matter. The article
examines the "sweeping-claims" exception under the common law and

under the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 It demonstrates that the federal
courts have had difficulty accommodating the sweeping-claim exception within the framework of the new federal evidence code. Their

problems reflect not only the code's failure to offer any guidance in this
area, but also the sweeping-claims exception's lack of a solid underpinning in the common law of evidence. The article proposes that the
sweeping-claims exception be elevated to an express rule because it is

in accord with the general purposes of the modem evidence code, and
because most courts now endorse the exception. Its codification,
through amendments to rules 607 and 608 of the Federal Rules of Evi* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law; A.B. 1965,
Georgetown University- J.D. 1968, Villanova University; LL.M. 1977, Harvard University.
1. The impact of the Federal Rules of Evidence, both as proposed and as enacted, has been
profound. In 1974 the Uniform Rules of Evidence were amended to "reflect as closely as possible" the Federal Rules of Evidence. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Commissioners' Prefatory Note. Furthermore, as of January 1981, 21 states had adopted evidence codes patterned in
whole or in part on the enacted or proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See ALASKA R. EvWD.
101-1101; ARi7. R. EviD. 101-1103; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979); CoLo. R. EvID. 101-1103;
DEL. UNInoFM R. Evm. 101-1103; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-.958 (West 1979); HAWAn REv.
STAT. § 626-1 (1980 Special Pamphlet); ME. RbEVID. 101-1102; MICH. R. EviD. 101-1102; MINN.
R. Evw. 101-1101; MoNT. R. EvwD. 101-1008; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to -1103 (1979); NEv.
REv. STAT. §§ 47.020-56.020 (1977); N.M. R. EviD. 101-1102; N.D. R. EVID. 101-1103; OHio R.
EviD. 101-1103; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3103 (West 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 19-9-1 to -18-8 (1979); WASH. CT. R. (ER) 101-1101; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (West
1975); Wyo. R. EvD. 101-1104.
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dence, would promote uniformity and predictability of judicial treatment of the collateral-matter rule.
I.

THE COLLATERAL-MATTER RULE

The collateral-matter rule applies whenever one party seeks to introduce evidence to contradict the testimony of an opposing party's earlier witness.2 Generally stated, the rule forbids the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness on a collateral matter. Its
purpose is to limit the scope of impeachment to the introduction of
evidence that is relevant to the important issues in dispute. The collat-eral-matter rule therefore functions as a corollary to the relevancy requirement; however, for pragmatic policy reasons, it excludes evidence
that is logically relevant to the credibility of witnesses.
The test for the admissibility of evidence that contradicts prior testimony requires a determination of whether that testimony concerned a
"collateral" matter. The most widely accepted definition of collateral
matter derives from the 1847 English case of Attorney-General v. Hitchcock. 3 Hitchcock was charged with the illegal use of an untaxed cistern
to make malt. The prosecutor called a witness named Spooner who
testified to Hitchcock's use of the cistern. On cross-examination,
Spooner was asked whether he had told anyone that tax officers offered
him twenty pounds to testify about Hitchcock's illegal activities.
Spooner denied that he had made such a statement and rejected any
suggestion that he had received a bribe.4 The defense then attempted
to introduce the testimony.of its own witness, Cook, that Spooner had
told him that the tax officers had offered Spooner twenty pounds to
testify against the defendant. The court sustained the prosecution's objection to this testimony. The appellate court unanimously affirmed the
trial court's ruling by holding that the matter on which the defense
sought to contradict Spooner was collateral: whether Spooner had ever
told anyone that he had been offered a bribe was not strictly relevant to
whether Hitchcock had used the cistern.5 The court stated the test of
collateralness as follows:
[I]f the answer of a witness is a matter which you would be allowed
on your part to prove in evidence-if it have such a connection with
the issue, that you would be allowed to give it
in evidence-then it is
6
a matter on which you may contradict him.
2. See C. McCoRImcK, EVIDENCE § 47 (Cleary rev. 1972); 3A J. WIOMORE,. EVIDENCE
§§ 878, 943, 1000-07 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
3. 154 Eng. Rep. 38 (Exch. Ch. 1847). See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1002.
4. 154 Eng. Rep. at 44 (Rolfe, B.).
5. Id at 38 (Rolfe, B.).
6. Id at 42 (Pollock, C.B.).
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Under this test, Cook's testimony had to be admissible during Hitchcock's case-in-chief, independent of Spooner's denial. For example,
evidence that Spooner had taken a bribe would have been admissible
apart from any denial by Spooner on cross-examination because it establishes a pecuniary interest or improper motivation. 7 Evidence that
Spooner had been offered a bribe or had said as much before trial,
however, has little bearing on whether Spooner was an impartial
witness.8

The judges in Hitchcock recognized that evidence contradicting
any part of Spooner's testimony under oath is relevant to some degree,
even if it concerns a collateral matter.9 The contradicting evidence, if
believed by the jury, would show that Spooner had lied under oath,
albeit on an inconsequential matter, and would obviously assist the
jury in weighing the credibility of his testimony.' 0 The imposition of
limitations on the admissibility of such evidence, then, must be
justified.
The Hitchcock court stated three entirely pragmatic reasons in
support of the collateral-matter rule. The first reason is to prevent unfair surprise to the witness; the court noted "the inconvenience that
would arise from the witness being called to answer to particular acts of
his life, which he might have been able to explain, if he had reasonable
notice to do so."" The second reason is to save time by avoiding prolonged inquiries into relatively unimportant matters. Consideration of
"every possible question [that] might be suggested, for the purpose of
seeing by such means whether the whole was unfounded," is simply
impracticable.' 2 Finally, if much time is spent on matters not directly
relevant to the central issues of the trial, there is an increased likelihood
that the jury will become confused about the important issues.13 The
collateral-matter rule theoretically moves trials to a speedy conclusion
by denying lawyers the opportunity to chase witnesses down every possible trail in the hope of ensnaring them in falsehood.
The pragmatic reasons for the collateral-matter rule offered in
Hitchcock are not its sole justifications. Professor Wigmore developed
a "logical reason" to explain why some attacks on a witness's credibility are permissible under the rule even though the precise testimony
7. See C. McCoRMiciC, supra note 2, § 41 at 80.
8. 154 .Eng. Rep. at 43 (Pollock, C.B.).
9. Id at 43-44 (Rolfe, B.).
10. See generally J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1008.
11. 154 Eng. Rep. at 44 (Alderson, B.). See generally J. WIGMORF, spra note 2, § 1002.
12. 154 Eng. Rep. at 44 (Rolfe, B.).
13. See id at 44 (Alderson, B.); J. WIGMoRE, supra note 2, § 1002.
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attacked can be literally defined as "collateral." 14 Wigmore reasons
that when the alleged testimonial error concerns an immaterial fact, the
party who offers the contradiction asks the fact finder to infer from the
error that other testimony by the witness concerning material facts is
likewise in error. The ease with which the fact finder makes this inferential leap from the demonstrated immaterial error to an undemonstrated material error depends on the nature of the fact addressed by
the contradicting evidence. Some contradictions reveal not only a discrepancy in the previous witness's testimony concerning an immaterial
fact, but also the source of, or reason for the error. If the source of the
immaterial error can logically serve as the source of material errors,
then the contradictory testimony is admissible. In this instance the contradicting evidence aids the fact finder in inferring from the demonstrated immaterial error that more important parts of the witness's
testimony may be incorrect. For example, suppose in the Hitchcock
case that Spooner was asked on cross-examination whether he had ever
been fired from a job by the defendant. Spooner denies it, but the defense brings on witness Cook to testify that he was present when the
defendant discharged Spooner from a job. If Cook's testimony is believed, it not only contradicts Spooner's denial but also reveals grounds
for doubting Spooner's testimony incriminating the defendant..
Furthermore, continues Wigmore, even when the contradicting evidence does not supply the reason for the error, it can still assist the
trier of fact in inferring more important testimonial errors if the error
concerns facts closely related in condition and circumstance to more
important facts.' 5 In such a case the fact finder can easily and reasonably infer that whatever caused the error demonstrated by the, contradicting evidence could also undermine the witness's testimony about
more important facts. For example, assume that on direct examination
Spooner testifies that he saw the defendant making malt in the cistern,
and that the cistern was concealed in the defendant's barn. Suppose
further that on cross-examination Hitchcock's barrister asks Spooner to
describe the color of Hitchcock's barn. Spooner testifies that it is red.
On rebuttal the defense calls an impartial witness familiar with the
barn to testify that Hitchcock's barn always has been white-washed.
According to Wigmore, the contradictory testimony should be admitted
even though the fact revealed by the testimony, the color of the barn,
offers no explanation why Spooner lied or was mistaken. Nevertheless,
because Spooner's observations of the barn and the cistern were closely
14. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1001.
15. Id
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related in time and circumstance, the factfinder reasonably can infer
from the error that Spooner had never seen Hitchcock's barn, and
16
therefore had falsely accused him.

Wigmore reduced the collateral-matter rule to a simple one-sentence test: "Could the fact, as to which error is predicated, have been
shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction?"17 This test, however helpful, is somewhat opaque because it
begs the following question: "Which facts are admissible 'indepen-

dently of the contradiction?"' In this respect, Professor Maguire's
statement of the collateral-matter test is more complete:
Independent evidence may be given to prove a self-contradictory
statement by a primary witness only if (a) the statement contradicts
testimony by the primary witness about a matter directly in issue in
the litigation, or (b) the statement contradicts testimony by the primary witness as to "those matters which affect the motives, temper,
with reference to his feelings toward
and character of the witness...
18
one party or the other."

Part (a) of the test is simply a statement of the most obvious fact
about Anglo-American trials. When your adversary's witness has testified that fact A is true, it is proper to offer testimony to contradict that
point if the existence or nonexistence of fact A will have a material
effect on the outcome of the case. Evidence offered to rebut a fact asserted in defense of the suit also falls within category (a), matters di-

rectly in issue; the collateral-matter rule does not prevent the
prosecution from offering such evidence.' 9 In these circumstances, it is
difficult to contend that the contradicting evidence is not admissible
16. This aspect of Wigmore's "logical reason" rationale seems to correspond to McCormick's
vaguely phrased "third type of allowable contradiction, namely, the contradiction of any part of
the witness's account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which as a
matter of human experience he would not have been mistaken about if his story were true." C.
McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 47, at 99 (footnote omitted). A footnote supporting this quote is full
of examples of this "linchpin of the story" type of contradiction. Id n. 100. Wigmore treats this
contradiction of an immaterial but key fact as noncollateral impeachment. See J. WIGMORE,
supra note 2, § 1005(f). However, as McCormick points out, this type of contradiction does not
meet the test of noncollateralness espoused by Wigmore himself. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note

2, § 47, at 99. This apparent anomaly is discussed in text accompanying notes-28-33 infra.
17. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1003, at 961. Note that this definition of a noncollateral fact
does not appear to permit contradiction of immaterial "key fact" or "linchpin of the story" testimony. See note 16 supra.
18. J.MAGUIRE, EvIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 67 (1947) (quoting Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 154 Eng. Rep. 38, 42 (Exch. Ch. 1847) (Pollack, C.B.)).
19. See, eg., State v. Gakin, 24 Wash. App. 681, 603 P.2d 380 (1979); Lunde v. State, 85 Wis.
80, 270 N.W.2d 180 (1978). Cf People v. Mitchell, 402 Mich. 506, 518, 265 N.W.2d .163, 169
(1978) ("If a [murder] defendant were to claim, for example, that [the deceased's] homosexual
overtures were shocking and offensive and that the reasonableness of [the defendant's] subsequent
conduct should be assessed with that in mind, evidence of [the defendant's] comparable homosexual experience might tend to refute the claimed 'sense of outrage' ").
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"independently of the contradiction. ' 20 When an attorney offers rebuttal testimony that contradicts a material fact, he offers it to disprove
that fact, not merely to impeach the previous witness by contradiction.
If the contradicting testimony were not probative of a disputed material
fact, however, it would have no relevant purpose apart from impeachment by contradiction and it would be collateral. 21 Thus, evidence of
other uncharged crimes, wrongful acts, or conduct offered to prove
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident ' 22 does not run afoul of the ban on
extrinsic impeachment of collateral matters. All of these proofs concern material issues regardless of when or by whom they are first raised
23
at trial.
Part (b) of Maguire's formulation of the test refers to those facts
that, if shown in contradiction, can call into question the contradicted
witness's credibility. These independently admissible facts are readily
categorized into those that demonstrate bias, 24 lack of opportunity or
capacity to perceive material facts to which one testifies, 25 corruption, 26
or interest in the outcome of the case.27 These are facts that, under
20. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1002.

21. Cf. Harrell v. State, 593 S.V.2d 664, 668 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (other-crime evidence
offered to rebut the defendant's claim of ignorance that a crime was being committed held properly offered to prove a material element of the crime and to impeach witness); State v. Gakin, 24
Wash. App. 681, 603 P.2d 380 (1979) (evidence rebutting the defendant's claim of ignorance of
how to drill open a safe was admissible as substantive evidence and to impeach the defendant by
'contradiction).
22. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
23. In United States v. Gubelman, 571 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978),
in which the defense of a meat inspector charged with taking bribes was essentially one of mistaken identification, the court held there was no error in permitting the prosecutor to introduce
evidence of bribes taken by the defendant from four companies not charged in the indictment.
Evidence of two of the uncharged bribes was adduced during the government's case-in-chief, and
the remaining two were proved in its rebuttal case.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1976) (trial court erroneously
refused to permit defense witness to testify about the government witness's claim that the defendant had fathered her child and that she had vowed revenge). See also United States v. Haggett,
438 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1971).
25. See, eg., United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979). In Opager the court held
that the trial judge erroneously excluded as collateral testimony evidence that the defendant and a
government witness had not worked together at a particular salon during a certain period. This
testimony would have disproved statements made by the government witness.
26. Cf. United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975) (error, albeit harmless, not to permit the defense to cross-examine government witness concerning witness's solicitation of a bribe from the defendant through an intermediary).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1978) (prosecution was permitted to contradict the denials of a defense witness that he had told the rebuttal
witness that he "had a great deal riding on the outcome of this proceeding" because evidence of
bias or interest "is never collateral").
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Wigmore's "logical reason," readily identify sources of potential testi-

monial error.
It should be noted that neither Wigmore's nor Maguire's formulation of the collateral-matter rule as drawn from Hitchcock accounts for

everything that courts call noncollateral. For instance, recall the hypothetical cross-examination of Spooner concerning the color of Hitchcock's barn.2 8 The rebutting testimony does not contradict the witness
about a matter directly in issue, nor does it tend to prove bias,
29
prejudice, corruption, or lack of ability or capacity to perceive. Mc-

Cormick concedes that this type of impeachment is collateralunder the

traditional test.30 Extrinsic contradiction of nonmaterial, linchpin facts
can be justified as contradiction of "clearly connected" facts 3 ' and

therefore noncollateral impeachment under Wigmore's "logical reason" for the Hitchcock rule. The problem is that the courts' formulation of the Wigmore test 32 does not appear to allow contradictions of

nonmaterial, linchpin matters. Nevertheless, such contradictions can
seriously undermine the witness' credibility, and many courts permit
33
them.
When trial courts believe that justice would be served by permitting impeachment despite a rule prohibiting it, they exercise discretion
34
to ignore the collateral-matter rule and permit the contradiction.
And when appellate courts affirm such actions, the cases become impossible to reconcile and the rule itself difficult to recognize and apply. 3 5 The next two sections illustrate some of the difficulties arising
28. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
29. Contradiction of the statement regarding the color of the barn does not tend to show why
the witness lied or was mistaken.
30. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 47, at 99. See notes 16-17 supra.
31. J. WioMopm, supra note 2, § 1001, at 958.
32. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
33. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1003, at 961 & n.2.
34. See notes 224-25 infra and accompanying text.
35. E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 55

(1979) ("The collateral fact rule is a confused area of law"). See cases cited in C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 2, § 47, at 99-100 & n.57 ("This test is of necessity a vague one because it must meet an
indefinite variety of situations'); J. WIoMORE, supra note 2, § 1003, at 962 ("Other courts are
content to invoke simply the term collateral, and to decide according to the circumstances of each
case"); Dolan, Rule 43: ThePrejudiceRule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 264 (1976) ("There
is no doubt that the collateral question doctrine is... the most difficult [concept] to deal with,
often resembling a gestalt rule of evidence").
A major source of difficulty in the application of the collateral-impeachment rule is that extrinsic testimony that contradicts prior testimony often can be offered to prove several propositions simultaneously. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is normally hearsay and
admissible only to contradict the subject matter of the statement. However, if the hearsay exclusion does not apply, the prior inconsistent statement is admissible also to establish the truth of the
matter asserted in the out-of-court statement. Extrinsic testimony about prior misconduct by the

DUKE L4WJOURTAL

[Vol. 1982:61

from attempts to apply the collateral-mater rule.
II.

CROSS-EXAMINATION AND CONTRADICTION BY

"EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE"

The collateral-matter rule prohibits contradiction of an opponent's
witness with extrinsic evidence. A party may elicit a contradiction,
even on collateral matters, 36 from the witness himself on cross-examination, but the rule forbids the parading of witnesses to the stand to
give the contradicting evidence. Thus, in the Hitchcock case, the defendant's counsel was allowed to cross-examine Spooner concerning his
alleged pretrial statements about collateral matters, but, in the litigator's parlance, counsel had to "take" the witness's answers.37 The pragmatic underpinnings of the rule-the shortness of life and the length of
court dockets-.-explain why it permits cross-examination but not extrinsic testimony concerning collateral facts. Attempts to elicit contradiction on cross-examination intrude only minimally on the efficiency
of the trial. If the witness admits the error, the matter is finished, the
trial moves on, and the jury can take the admitted error into account in
assessing the witness's credibility. If the witness denies the error, little
time is lost, for no rebuttal witnesses are allowed to contradict him on
the collateral matter. Wigmore best states the nature of the rule: "It is
not that the law of impeachment loves cross-examination more, but
witness may tend to prove the additional proposition that the witness is a person of bad character,
unworthy of belief.
If the attacked witness is a party to the suit, the potential multiple uses of the misconduct
evidence increase. Assume the witness to be contradicted is a criminal defendant charged with
bribery of a public official and the prosecution offers evidence of uncharged bribes of officials by
the defendant. There are two possible further uses of the evidence, one permitted and one not. If
the evidence is offered to prove that the defendant has a tendency to obtain government contracts
by bribery and that he, therefore, probably bribed the procurement officer in the instant case, then
the evidence runs afoul of the rule excluding propensity evidence, Le., evidence of a character trait
to prove conduct in conformity therewith. See FED.R. EVID. 404(a)-(b). However, if the evidence
tends to prove the defendant's intent, motive, opportunity, identity, plan, or design to bribe the
official in the instant case, or that the defendant's giving of an item of value to the official was not
mistaken or accidental, then the extrinsic evidence is admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); C.
McCoRucK, supra note 2, § 190. The collateral-matter rule operates in a trial context in which
there are many overlapping rules at work because of the many permissible and impermissible uses
of the offered evidence. It is not surprising that, faced with an offer of extrinsic proof of the
defendant's prior bad acts that have not resulted in a conviction, courts find it difficult to sort out
quickly and accurately the permissible from the impermissible purposes for which the evidence is
offered. Uncertainty about what the term "collateral" encompasses aggravates the complexity
surrounding this determination.
36. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 878, 1006(2), 1023.
37. See Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 154 Eng. Rep. 38, 44 (Exch. Ch. 1847) (Alderson,
B.). See also Hug v. United States, 329 F.2d 475, 483 (6th Cir.), cer. dened, 379 U.S. 818 (1964).
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that it loves extrinsic testimony less." 38
Allowing cross-examination but not extrinsic evidence on collateral points illustrates the anomalous fact that "collateral' and "irrelevant" are not coextensive terms. If collateral matters are irrelevant,
they are not a proper subject even on direct examination. Thus, a collateral matter constitutes an area of inquiry that is not so irrelevant to
preclude cross-examination, but not relevant enough to permit extrinsic
proof. A good example of such an area is found in Federal Rule of
Evidence 608(b). 39 The rule permits cross-examination into specific instances of the witness's conduct that may demonstrate the untruthful
character of the witness.40 For the same reasons that underlie the collateral-matter rule, however, the cross-examiner may not introduce extrinsic testimony to contradict the witness's denials of the instances of
prior misconduct. The rule is, designed to permit impeachment of witnesses by brief commando raids but not by full scale invasions on collateral points. The meaning of the term "extrinsic," however, is far
from settled in the federal courts.
Some courts apply a broad definition of "extrinsic" when a witness
is confronted on cross-examination with a document or other tangible
evidence that tends to contradict him on an admittedly collateral point.
For example, in UnitedStates v. Herzberg4 l the prosecutor, while crossexamining the defendant, introduced into evidence the report of a court
decision to contradict the witness's denial that he had been sued by a
particular person. The prosecutor called no witness of his own to introduce the case report. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that admission of the document was impermissible as impeachment
with extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter. 42 .In United States v.
Whitehead43 the trial court had ruled that if the defendant, an attorney
charged with racketeering, took the stand, the prosecution would be
38. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 878, at 648.

39. FED. IL EvD. 608(b) provides:
Specffc instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if proba-

tive of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
(1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 617 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.denied, 101 S. Ct. 3055
(1981) (prosecutor allowed, under rule 608(b), to ask the defendant about a false statement the
defendant had made to a former employer).
41. 558 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
42. Id at 1223-24. The court nevertheless held that admission of the report was harmless
error and refused to reverse the conviction.
43. 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980).
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allowed to introduce documentary evidence of the defendant's previous
suspension from practice by the state bar for conduct involving deceit
and misrepresentation. 44 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that although the defendant could have been cross-examined concerning his suspension, the documents dealing with this suspension
were not admissible because Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits
the use of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct to prove
45
untruthful character.
It seems that the broad definition of extrinsic evidence used in
these cases is wholly unnecessary. The policy reasons for excluding
extrinsic evidence are the avoidance of undue prolongation of the trial,
confusion of the issues, and unfair surprise to the witness. 46 None of
these policies is necessarily violated when a witness is confronted with
nontestimonial evidence on cross-examination. If he is confronted with
a document and admits its authenticity, the contradiction is completed,
swiftly and clearly. Recognizing the logic of this position, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a narrower definition of "extrinsic" in Carter v. Hewitt, 47 a prison inmate's suit against guards who
allegedly beat him. The plaintiff was confronted on cross-examination
with a letter, admittedly written by him several months after the incident, that appeared to urge other inmates to file false reports of beatings by guards. The trial court permitted the letter to be introduced
into evidence to impeach the plaintiffs credibility. The Third Circuit
affirmed, ruling that admission of the letter did not violate Federal
Rule of Evidence 608(b) because the impeachment did not involve calling other witnesses to testify. When the extrinsic evidence comes from
the witness himself the rule's "core concerns are not implicated." 48
Therefore, the court stated, only when the attacked witness denies the
44. Id at 528.
45. id at 529. But see United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Kinnard
the court reversed the trial court's ruling that a prosecution witness in a narcotics-sale case could
not be forced to display his arms, revealing needle "tracks." The appellate court concluded that

such evidence was not collateral but rather was probative of a motive of the witness to falsify his
testimony and hence it bore directly on the question of the defendant's guilt. Id at 573-74.
46. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
47. 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980).
48. Id at 969-70. Accord United States v. Senak, 521 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975). In Senak the
defendant, an attorney paid by the court to represent indigent criminal defendants, was charged
with extorting fees from his clients by threatening them with inadequate representation. Under
cross-examination, the defendant claimed that the fee he received from one client was proper and,
as such, he reported it on his income tax return. He then was confronted with his tax return in
which the fee was not reported. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the use of
the tax return was a proper nonextrinsic attack on the defendant's character for truthfulness under
FED. R. Evw. 608(b). 521 F.2d at 146. See also State v. Cervantes, 92 N.M. 643, 593 P.2d 478,
(Ct. App. 1979). Cervantes held that asking a defendant witness to identify drug paraphernalia
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authenticity of the document and it is necessary to call additional witnesses to establish the admissibility of the document are the "core concerns" of the collateral-matter rule and rule 608(b) implicated. Only
then would "these collateral matters assume a prominence at trial out
of proportion to their significance." 49 When the impeaching document
is either conceded by the attacked witness or self-authenticating, no
trial time is lost, the witness is not surprised unfairly with an undocumentated allegation, and the danger of jury confusion is minimal because only a brief part of the trial is spent on the subject.50 And when
the document or other nontestimonial evidence is not identified or conceded by the witness, the examiner must "take the answer" because the
matter inquired about is collateral.
III.

THE

DIRECT

EXAMINATION/CROSS-EXAMINATION

DIsTINCTION

Conflicting theories regarding the definition of "extrinsic" are not
the only obstacle to a consistent and reliable application of the collateral-matter rule. Obviously the court must determine whether the matter to be contradicted is collateral. Problems develop when the matter
sought to be contradicted originally arises on direct rather than on
cross-examination. This section discusses the distinction and examines
the various justifications for making exceptions to the rule when the
matter is first raised on direct examination.
First, we must distinguish the easy case. Courts encounter little
difficulty in applying the collateral-matter rule to matters first raised
during cross-examination. When the cross-examiner seeks to call a witness to contradict the testimony he elicited, the court, on objection,
must apply the collateral-noncollateral test in deciding whether the
contradicting witness may testify. But if the testimony that the witness
is called to contradict was brought out on the direct examination of the
first witness, the court's task is not so straightforward. In these situations courts have tended to apply the collateral-matter rule differently,
as the following discussion demonstrates.
Theoretically, whether the point to be contradicted with extrinsic
testimony arises on direct as opposed to cross-examination should have
no effect on the rule's operation. Certainly the test of collateralness
itself,ie., whether the matter can be proved independently of the contradiction, does not expressly make the direct-cross distinction an operative fact. The point of the test is that the matter need not have been
found in his home "is not proving specific conduct by extrinsic evidence." Id at 651, 593 P.2d at

486.
49. 617 F.2d at 970.
50. Id at 971; J. WIMoRE, su.pra note 2, § 979.
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raised at all before the extrinsic proof is offered. Wigmore argues that
extrinsic contradiction of collateral matters first raised on direct examination should not be permitted because, even though the witness can
no longer claim unfair surprise, there is still the risk of confusion of
issues. 51 Furthermore, if a witness opened the door to contradiction on
everything said during direct, trials would go on forever.52 Nevertheless, Wigmore notes disparagingly a solid line of state and federal cases
that hold that if a witness testifies to a certain fact on direct examination, the opposing side may introduce witnesses to prove the fact's falsity regardless of whether it is collateral. 53 The cases adopting this
exception justify it in a number of ways. Although the reasons are interrelated to greater or lesser degrees, they can be distinguished by
close examination of the cases and of the courts' language.
A. JustlKcation of the Exception by "DefinitionalStop."
The first ground for permitting the contradiction of all matters
raised on direct seems to rest on an altered definition of the collateralmatter rule itself. For example, a 1925 Montana case5 4 simply held
that "the rule prohibiting rebuttal and impeachment on a collateral
matter is confined to matters brought out on cross-examination."55 The
court gave no reason for apparently excepting all matters raised during
direct examination from the prohibition of contradiction with extrinsic
testimony. The Montana court cited two of its earlier cases and Wharton's CriminalEvidence treatise 56 in support of its ruling.57 Wharton
also espoused this position in his Law of Evidence treatise,5 but he
provides scant explanation for his narrow view of the rule. He cites
two cases, only one of which directly supports his view that the collateral-matter rule applies only to testimonial evidence introduced during
cross-examination. 59 In neither of these cases did the courts cite au51. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1007, at 980. See also C. McCoRMicK, supra note 2, § 47, at
98.
52. Powell v. State, 260 Ark. 381, 384, 540 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1976) ("Without the restriction on
collateral matters a simple trial could be carried on for years").
53. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1007, at 979 n.1 (citing two federal and eleven state cases).

54. State v. Mott, 72 Mont. 306, 233 P. 602 (1925).
55. Id at 311, 233 P. at 604. The facts of this case could have yielded an argument that the

matter at issue was not collateral; however, the court held that the matter at issue was collateral.
56. F. WHARTON, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL IssuEs § 484 (8th ed. 1880).
57. State v. Mott, 72 Mont. 306, 311, 233 P. 602, 604 (1925).
58. 1 F. WHARTON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 559, at 535 (1877).
59. The two cases are State v. Sargent, 32 Me. 429 (1851) and Whitney v. City of Boston, 98
Mass. 312 (1867). In Sargent the issue concerned the preparatory phase of a criminal act. Although the court expressed doubt whether such a matter could ever be considered immaterial or
collateral, it held that because the matter was not first raised on cross-examination, the rule
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thority or give reasons supporting their conclusions.60
One possible reason why some courts hold that the collateral-impeachment prohibition applies only to facts that are both collateral and
brought out on cross-examination may stem from a narrow reading of

precedent. Because the questions on appeal usually arise in a trial context in which the cross-examiner first elicits the fact later sought to be

contradicted, the appellate court decisions generally state the rule in
terms of that context: "It has long been held that a witness cannot, for

the purpose of impeaching him, be contradicted on immaterial or collateral matters brought out on cross-examination."'61 Later courts and
commentators may have interpreted the factual context of these hold62
ings as a substantive limitation on the rule itself.

This reasoning leads students of the rule to a dead end; it applies a

"definitional stop" to further argument. It focuses not on the collateralness of the matter to be contradicted, but on the point during the trial
at which the matter is raised. The "definitional stop" is the weakest

justification for the exception.
against extrinsic contradiction of collateral matters did not apply, and that the exclusion of the
testimony was error. 32 Me. at 430-3 1.
In Whitney the court held that the contradiction did not concern a collateral point, but rather

affected the "weight and value" to be given to the first witness's testimony. 98 Mass. at 316.
60. State v. Sargent,.32 Me. 429 (1851), illustrates McCormick's theory that "linchpin" facts
are not collateral and, therefore, may be contradicted by extrinsic proof. C. McCoRMICK, supra
note 2, § 47, at 99. Whitney v. City of Boston, 98 Mass. 312 (1867), on the other hand, was
questionably cited by Wharton. The matter on which the plaintiffs witness, an expert real estate
appraiser, was contradicted was raised on cross-examination. Id at 314. Whitney falls more comfortably into the category of cases holding that an expert witness's specific prior errors may be
shown, in the discretion of the court, by extrinsic proof when they tend to demonstrate the expert's
failure to possess a special qualification or to exercise the degree of skill necessary to testify as an
expert. See Wilson v. Granby, 47 Conn. 59, 75-76 (1879); J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 991,
1005(d), at 922, 969. Wigmore is understandably vague, given the lack of uniformity among the
courts, about whether such matters are collateral or whether contradiction should be allowed. He
states in section 1005(d): "Particular instances of error indicating lack of expertness are usually
not provable by extrinsic testimony, while circumstances other than these, diminishing the witness'
Such facts, therefore, may or may not be provaqualifications, may perhaps be thus proved ....
ble in contradiction." Id § 1005(d), at 969.
61. State v. Curtis, 108 Kan. 537, 541, 196 P. 445, 447 (1921). See also Carpenter v. Ward, 30
N.Y. 243, 245 (1864) ("But to entitle the [cross-] examining counsel to show this discrepancy for
the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, it must either appear that the testimony
related to a point material to the issue of trial, or to a fact brought out on the examination of the
adverse counsel") (emphasis in original).
62. Eg., United States v. Lambert, 463 F.2d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The general rule is
that a witness may not be impeached by contradiction as to collateral or irrelevant matters elicited
on cross-examination").
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The Quasi-EstoppelJustffcationfor the Exception.

Many of the cases permitting the contradiction of collateral matters raised on direct examination speak in terms of quasi-estoppel. Because the witness "opened the door," he is in no position to complain
when the adverse party seeks to disprove the testimony. 63 A typical
example is People v. Roemer, 64 a murder case in which the defendant
took the stand. His counsel asked if he had ever been charged with
killing anyone, and Roemer answered that he had not. On cross-examination the prosecutor attempted to contradict the defendant's assertion. It is not clear from the opinion whether the prosecutor introduced
extrinsic evidence of a previous murder charge, but the court stated in
dicta that "the defendant had opened the door and invited the inquiry
by his own testimony and it became permissible to refute that testimony by direct evidence to the contrary." 65 Under any formulation of
the Hitchcock rule, it is collateral that Roemer had been previously
charged with an unrelated murder. Additionally, the prior accusation
is not admissible as evidence of the defendant's bias, interest, or lack of
opportunity or capacity to perceive relevant facts.6 6 Nor was the prior
murder charge relevant to any substantive issue in the case. Hence, the
prior charge was not independently admissible by the prosecution apart
from the contradiction. The defendant's raising of the subject, however, made it a valid area of inquiry.
Two possible rationales explain the development of this quasi-estoppel theory. Wigmore suggests the first.67 He states that before all
the reasons for the Hitchcock rule had crystallized in court decisions, it
was thought that the ban on collateral contradiction existed only to prevent surprising the witness. Thus, if the witness originally raised the
matter at trial, the rule loses its rationale. Wigmore observes that the
other policy reasons-saving time and avoiding confusion of the jurycontinue to weigh against collateral impeachment regardless of whether
the facts to be contradicted are elicited on direct or on cross68
examination.
A second possible rationale for the quasi-estoppel theory is that if
a party introduces certain testimony to sustain its side of an issue, that
63. See Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Waiver of Right to Object Other
Than by Failureto Make Objection-The Concept of"Door Opening" 16 CRIm. L. BULL. 461,464-

65 (1980).
64. 114 Cal. 51, 45 P. 1003 (1896).
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id at 55, 45 P. at 1003.
See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1007, at 979.
Id See also C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 47, at 98.
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party should be precluded from denying the materiality of such testimony in attempting to prevent its contradiction. 69 If this rationale implies that everything that is said on direct examination is relevant to a
disputed material issue, then it completely ignores the reality of witness
testimony at trial. Normally, some of a witness's testimony relates to
his personal background and to facts giving color and dimension to the
material testimony. For example, before an eyewitness to a traffic accident recounts what he observed, he usually describes who he is and
where he was going at the time of the incident in question. Although
these matters are collateral to the issue of who caused the accident, they
are nevertheless properly adduced on direct examination. 70 The collateral-matter rule rests on the assumption that it is worth the time, effort,
and possible confusion to permit some but not all of the direct testimony to be contradicted. To permit the contradiction of all direct testimony under this justification, however, ignores the rule and
undermines its sound rationales.
C.

The Curative-AdmissibilityJusttcationfor the Exception.

Another frequently asserted justification for permitting the extrinsic contradiction of direct testimony not strictly material to a disputed
issue is the doctrine of "curative admissibility. ' 71 This doctrine closely
parallels the other justifications voiced by the courts for not applying
the collateral-matter rule to assertions made on direct examination.
The distinguishing focus of the curative-admissibility doctrine is that a
party who gains an advantage through the introduction of nonmaterial
evidence may not complain when the other party offers nonmaterial
evidence to offset that advantage. This concept of "invited error" requires the court to examine several elements to determine whether
otherwise inadmissible evidence properly entered the case. These elements are: how the inadmissible evidence got in; whether the other
party objected in a timely fashion to its introduction; how prejudicial
69. See Grimes v. Hill, 15 Colo. 359, 365, 25 P. 698, 700 (1891).
70. The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute. While situations
will arise which call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a point conceded by
the opponent, the ruling should be made on the bases of such considerations as waste of
time and undue prejudice (see Rule 403), rather than under any general requirement that
evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in dispute. Evidence which is essentially background in nature can scarcely be said to involve disputed matter, yet it is
universally offered and admitted as an aid to understanding.
FED. R. EvD. 401, Advisory Committee's Notes.
71. This term is Wigmore's. I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 15 (3d ed. 1940). See I D. LouiSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 11 (1977); Graham, supra note 63, at 461-65.
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the improper evidence was; and how prejudicial the rebutting proof
72
will be.

An example of a typical curative-admissibility case is Walker v.
Trico Manufacturing Co.,73 in which the manufacturer of a machine
rebutted the plaintiffs evidence of the "state of the art" with testimony
that had no relevance to its defense of the products liability action. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit assumed that plaintiffs stateof-the-art evidence prejudiced the defense and reasoned that the defendant therefore was entitled to offset the evidence with irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence of its own. 74 The court held that because "[t]he
plaintiff opened this matter during the presentation of her case in chief
. . . she cannot complain of Trico's attempt at rebuttal.

'75

The doctrine of curative admissibility should be limited, at least
conceptually, to cases like Walker in which the admission of rebuttal
evidence is justified to counteract prejudicial inadmissible evidence introduced by the other side. In other words, fire must fight fire.76 However, courts use the invited-error concept much more broadly: to
uphold the introduction of otherwise inadmissible rebuttal evidence to
contradict collateral but not clearly inadmissible testimony.
D. The Character-in-EvidenceJustficationfor the Exception.
The final justification for the exception to the collateral-matter
rule is closely related to the curative-admissibility doctrine. It is based
on the same equitable notion that once a party injects an issue into the
case, he bears the risk that the other side will exact a heavy price for his
having done so. These cases tend to concern direct testimony by the
defendant that the court believes "place[s] his character in issue." 77 In
such cases, the courts do not mean that by testifying, for example, that
he has never been in trouble with the law, a defendant makes his character an "essential element" of his defense. 73 They mean only that the
defendant has offered evidence of his good character as circumstantial
72. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 57, at 131. See also 1 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER,
supra note 71, § 11.
73. 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
74. 487 F.2d at 600. See United States v. Doran, 564 F.2d 1176, 1177 (5th Cir. 1977), cerl.
denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978). In Doran the court held that the defendant's direct testimony that he

had refused a government plea bargain because he was innocent "invited" the prosecutor's crossexamination into the defendant's withdrawn counter-offer to plead guilty.
75. 487 F.2d at 600.

76. McCormick titles the section of his treatise that deals with this topic, "Fighting Fire with
Fire: Inadmissible Evidence as Opening the Door." C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 57, at 131.
77. See, eg., United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1, 14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,385 U.S. 961 (1966);
State v. Patton, 593 S.W.2d 913, 920 (Tenn. 1979) (dissenting opinion). See also note 85 infra and

accompanying text.
78. See FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
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evidence of his innocence. 79 Criminal defendants are permitted to introduce this type of evidence, 80 but the defendants usually are restricted
to proof in the form of reputation or opinion testimony from "character

witnesses." ' Although trial courts technically would be correct in sustaining an objection to testimony by a criminal defendant concerning
his previous law-abiding habits, they rarely do so, perhaps because of
the same leniency toward the criminal defendant that produced the

rule permitting him to introduce favorable character evidence in the
first place.
Assuming, as the courts seem to do, that a defendant can testify to
his own good character in defense of a criminal charge, the next question is whether he thereby opens himself to contradiction with extrinsic

evidence. It is relatively clear that once a defendant has introduced
evidence of a pertinent character trait, the prosecution may attack his
character.82 However, under the Federal Rules of Evidence proof of
specific instances of conduct intended to disprove.the trait portrayed by
the defendant's evidence is limited to cross-examination.8 3 Extrinsic
rebuttal evidence, such as testimony by other witnesses, is permitted,
84
but such evidence is restricted to reputation or opinion form of proof.
Therefore, when a defendant makes a claim on direct that may be regarded as character evidence, the defendant may be cross-examined

about specific instances of conduct that are relevant to the trait
presented, but he should not be contradicted by extrinsic proof of prior
misconduct. Nevertheless, courts permit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence of prior criminal acts to rebut such self-portrayals of good
85
character.
79. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 71, § 138 (Supp. 1981).
80. FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(1).
81. See id 405(a).
82. See id 404(a)(1).
83. Id 405(a).
84. Id
85. For example, in United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 961
(1966), the court held that the prosecution properly introduced two rifles and several clips of
ammunition, taken from defendant at his arrest, to contradict his direct testimony in which he
portrayed himself as vigorously opposed to violent action. Cf. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d
1170, 1188-91 (9th Cir.) (prosecution had the right to cross-examine the defendant on the contents
of a book entitled "From the Movement Toward Revolution" after the defendant had testified on
direct about the contents of other books he had read to show his reading habits and his peaceable
character), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
Both McCormick, in the 1978 supplement to his evidence treatise, C. McCoRMIcK, supra
note 2, § 191, at 59, and Louisell and Mueller, in 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 71,
§ 138, at 49 (Supp. 1981), note that a defendant's testimony that he is not the type of person who
would commit the crime charged may open the door to rebuttal evidence. However, the authority
they cite for the proposition that the defendant can be attacked by extrinsic prior-crimes evidence
is limited to Bowe and a federal habeas corpus case in which the court applied the Pennsylvania
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The foregoing discussion of the collateral-matter rule demon-

strates the difficulty of its application. The federal courts in particular
display an unfocused and frequently inaccurate understanding of the
rule, especially since the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The

following sections discuss the common law collateral-matter rule in the
context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, focusing on one type of exception-what this article calls the "sweeping-claims" exception.
IV.

THE SWEEPING-CLAIMS EXCEPTION TO THE COLLATERALMATTER RULE

Just beyond the borders of the curative-admissibililty doctrine are

the cases in which a witness makes an "overly broad" 86 statement of
fact on direct examination. Often, the witness is a criminal defendant
who makes a false sweeping denial of any previous wrongdoing. Invariably, the other side does not object to the assertion, choosing instead

to exploit this vulnerability by means of contradicting testimony. In
short, the other side seizes a prime opportunity to prove that the witness is a perjurer. When the other party calls its contradicting witness,

the proponent of the first witness normally objects to the rebuttal testimony, and the judge must decide the point of law. The rebutting evidence of, for example, prior wrongdoing by the witness (but not his
prior criminal convictions), should be excluded under the collateralmatter rule. The evidence is not admissible independently of the con-

tradiction either to prove or to disprove a material fact, or to prove a
fact that calls into question the witness's credibility. The evidence does

not demonstrate a prior criminal conviction, and the point to be contradicted is not the factual "linchpin" of the witness's entire testimony.
Thus, the collateral-matter rule dictates the exclusion of the extrinsic

contradiction.8 7 The black-letter rules of evidence provide that the oplaw allowing otherwise inadmissible prior convictions to impeach a defendant's sweeping claims
of a blameless life. United States ex rel Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 997 (1976). McCormick also refers the reader to the section of his treatise on curative
admissibility. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 57. Thus, we are led from the rules governing
the impeachment of character testimony to the principles of curative admissibility to justify the
admissibility of specific instances of conduct by extrinsic evidence.
Notice that when the defendant takes the stand in his own behalf and testifies to his good
character, the government may attempt not only to rebut-his character evidence, but also to impeach him as it would any other witness. See Unites States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d at 14; J. WIOMORE,
supra note 2, §§ 890, 925. However, the credibility of a witness is not open to attack by extrinsic
evidence of specific instances of conduct. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b). See text accompanying notes
135-39 infra.

86. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 57, at 132 n.47.
87. Both Wigmore and McCormick opine that the operation of the collateral-matter rule
should not depend on whether the testimony to be contradicted is elicited on direct or on cross-
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ponent may cross-examine the witness concerning a statement made on
direct and attempt to make the witness recant, 88 but the examiner may
not contradict the testimony by calling other witnesses. In this type of
case, however, the courts regularly permit the collateral contradiction.
And, as this article shows, the reason for carving this sweeping-claims
exception out of the collateral-impeachment rule appears to be largely
the same reason behind the curative-admissibility doctrine: it is the fair
thing to do under the circumstances. 89 Despite the lack of any carefully
articulated rationale, and despite the inability to fit neatly within the
confines of any evidentiary rule, the contradiction of sweeping statements on collateral points made during direct examination has blossomed into an accepted practice in the federal courts.
A. The Development of the Sweeping-ClaimsException in the Federal
Common Law.
In a smattering of cases prior to 1954, a number of federal courts
adopted the proposition that immaterial facts first raised on direct examination may be contradicted with extrinsic proof.90 The reasons
given for allowing such rebuttal were not uniform, ranging from no
reason at all,91 to the familiar justification that the witness had "opened
examination. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 47, 57 n.47; J. WiGMORE, supra note 2, § 1007.
The courts have not heeded these learned professors in this context.
88. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 47; J. WIGMoRE, supra note 2, § 1006.
89. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 47. In United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.
1963), the court commented:
It is true ... that where a defendant, in his direct testimony, falsely states a specific fact,
the prosecution will not be prevented from proving. . . by calling its own witnesses, that
he lied as to thatfact. . . . The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to perceive, for
even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be allowed to
profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement.
Id at 588 (emphasis in original). In United States v.Winston, 447 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the
court, referring to the doctrine of curative admissibility, explained, "Permission to explore in rebuttal with testimony not admissible on direct, on the ground that the other party has opened the
doors, rest 'upon the necessity of removing prejudice in the interest of fairness.'" Id at 1240
(quoting Crawford v. United States, 198 F.2d 976, 979 (1952) (footnote omitted)). See also Graham, supra note 63, at 461-65.
90. E.g, Atkinson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 197 F.2d 244, 246 (10th Cir. 1952); Brady v.
United States, 148 F.2d 394, 395 (9th Cir. 1945); Peden v. United States, 54 F.2d 916, 917 (10th
Cir. 1931); Citizens' Bank-& Trust Co. v. Allen, 43 F.2d 549, 551-52 (4th Cir. 1930). Wigmore
incorrectly cites Union Pac. Ry. v. Reese, 56 F. 288 (9th Cir. 1893), as standing for this proposition. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1007, at 979 n.1. The Reese court did not go that far in its
holding because, as it noted, "[pilaintifis testimony as to his previous habits of sobriety was
brought out on cross-examination, and was clearly a collateral matter." 56 F. at 291.
91. In Peden v. United States, 54 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1931), a defendant charged with possesstill took the stand and testified on direct that he had nothing to do with the still
sion of an illegal
in question, and that he neither knew how to make whiskey nor had even been around a still. The
prosecutor impeached this testimony by producing a picture of the defendant at a different still
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the door."' 92 Other courts, conscious of the rule against extrinsic im-

peachment on collateral matters, simply stretched
the definition of
"noncollateral" to cover the matter before them. 93
In 1954, however, the Supreme Court decided Walder v. United

States,94 a case involving the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The decision significantly
advanced the development of the sweeping-claims exception to the
point that Waider and the cases expanding on it95 now stand for the
proposition that matters raised on direct examination may be contradicted by extrinsic evidence regardless of whether the matters are collateral. In Waider the venerable evidentiary rule against collateral
impeachment found in Hitchcock and espoused by Wigmore and Mc-

Cormick was partially eclipsed by an emerging rule of constitutional
criminal procedure. Today, it appears that the old principle is fast los96
ing ground, especially in criminal cases.
Walder was indicted for four sales of drugs to undercover narcotic
agents. On direct examination, during his case-in-chief, he volunteered
that he had never possessed, sold, or transferred narcotics. On cross-

examination he reiterated this testimony and denied that a capsule of
heroin was seized from his home two years before the transactions at
issue. In rebuttal, the prosecution called witnesses who testified that
heroin had in fact been seized from the defendant's home two years
earlier. 97 The Supreme Court upheld the admission of the testimony
concerning the prior narcotics seizure. The only question the Court
sometime earlier. The court held only that the picture was "clearly admissible for the purpose of
contradicting his evidence. . . ." Id at 917.
92. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 148 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1945). In Brady the defendant
was charged with concealing and transporting narcotics. On direct examination, he denied being
an addict or ever having seen, purchased, or used narcotics. On rebuttal, the prosecutor called a
witness who stated that while awaiting trial, the defendant underwent treatment for narcotic addiction under an assumed name. Affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated, "Had this showing been offered merely to degrade the accused it would no doubt
have been improper to admit it, but appellant himself opened the matter up. Thus evidence of
-addiction became relevant and proper as rebuttal." Id at 395.
93. See, e.g., Citizens' Bank & Trust Co. v. Allen, 43 F.2d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 1930). Only
when a party attempts either to explain away facts introduced against him, or to introduce evidence that tends to establish a defense, can it be said that evidence rebutting such explanation or
such evidence is not collateral because it tends to disprove a defense. See, e.g., Scott v. United
States, 172 U.S. 343, 346-48 (1899).
94. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
95. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
96. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980), discussed at text accompanying notes 17299 infra, is the most recent Supreme Court decision affecting this area.
97. The charges resulting from this earlier drug seizure were dismissed following a successful
evidentiary suppression motion. 347 U.S. at 62-63.
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addressed was whether the federal exclusionary rule98 prevented the
indirect use of tainted evidence. There was clear authority for Walder's

contention that illegally seized evidence may never be introduced in a
federal court for any purpose.99 It appeared that the case was con-

trolled byAgnello v. UnitedStates,100 in which the Court disallowed the
introduction of previously suppressed narcotics evidence in a fact situa-

tion identical to Walder, except that in Agnello the defendant's sweeping denial was first elicited on cross-examination. 10 1 TheAgnello Court

disapproved of the prosecutor's actions on constitutional grounds, but
its words sounded very much like those used by courts permitting extrinsic impeachment only of matters first raised on direct:
In his direct examination, Agnello was not asked and did not testify
concerning the [illegally seized and previously suppressed] can of cocaine. In cross-examination, in answer to a question over his objection, he said he had never seen it. He did nothing to waive his
constitutional protection or to justify cross-examination in respect 1of
02
the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the [illegal] search.

Agnello is largely in accord with Attorney-Generalv. Hitchcock 03 as a
matter of evidence law.1° 4 The prosecutor asked Agnello on cross-examination if he had ever seen the can of narcotics before; this matter
was clearly collateral to the trial's central issues.' 0 5 The prosecutor
98. Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, for example, in a warrantless
search and seizure without probable cause, will be excluded at trial. The history of the rule is long
and varied. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
99. See Silverthore Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.)
("The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at
all").
100. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
101. Id at 35.
102. Id
103. 154 Eng. Rep. 38 (Exch. Ch. 1847). See notes 3-13 supra and accompanying text.
104. See id at 45.
105. The prosecutor also inquired whether Agnello had ever seen cocaine before. 269 U.S. at
29. The propriety of this broad question, in contrast to asking about the particular can of cocaine,
is a close question that the collateral rule does not address. See text accompanying notes 36-40
supra. The question implies prior criminal conduct by the defendant and thus is highly prejudicial. Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, most federal courts probably would
have excluded the question as improper evidence of "bad character" or criminal propensity because the prior dealings with narcotics did not result in a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United
States v. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d 805,
806 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Pennix, 313 F.2d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 1963); Homan v. United
States, 279 F.2d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 535-37 (2d Cir.
1954). A court would probably reach the same result under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
United States v. Blackshire, 538 F.2d 569, 572 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 840 (1976); FED. R.
EviD. 608(b).
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Thus, the

prosecutor erred as a matter of evidentiary law, as well as a matter of
constitutional law, when he contradicted Agnello with the suppressed
evidence.' 0 7 In Walder, the Supreme Court distinguished Agnello on
the ground that Walder "[o]f his own accord,. . . went beyond a mere
denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made
the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcot-

ics."' 0 8 The Court declined to rest its holding on the constitutionalwaiver concept mentioned in Agnello. 109 Instead, it held that the defendant had abused the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule:
[To say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which
evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own
advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of
his untruths [would] be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.
He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
.... Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting
the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance
on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility."10

The Court apparently assumed that the federal common law of evidence did not prevent the prosecutor from contradicting Walder's
"sweeping claim" on direct."' Although that assumption was arguably
It can be argued that Agnello's direct testimony that he did not recognize the matter he was

carrying as cocaine made the broad cross-examination of Agnello concerning his prior familiarity
with cocaine proper. However, even if this broad examination were permitted, the prosecutor,
under the Hitchcock rule, would have been bound by the defendant's answers and would not have
been permitted to offer contradicting extrinsic evidence. See cases cited at note 106 infra.
106. See Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 659-61 (8th Cir. 1958); McKenzie v. United
States, 126 F.2d 533, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1942); McKune v. United States, 296 F. 480, 480 (9th Cir.
1924); Beyer v. United States, 282 F. 225, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1922); Rau v. United States, 260 F. 131,
136 (2d Cir. 1919).
107. Accord Mahoney v. United States, 26 F.2d 902, 903 (4th Cir. 1928) (improper contradiction of the defendant's cross-examination testimony with previously suppressed liquor found at
defendant's home during her arrest).
108. 347 U.S. at 65.
109. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
110. 347 U.S. at 65 (footnote omitted).
111. See id at 65 n.3. Although a few federal precedents existed, see note 90 supra, the
Wader Court did not cite them. In support of its evidence law holding, the Court cited only the
following quote from Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948): "The price a defendant
must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire subject which the law
has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields
the Court apparently recognized that the
him." Id at 479. By preceding the citation with "Cf."
quoted portion of Justice Jackson's opinion inMichelson addressed a completely different evidentiary principle than that involved in Walder. Justice Jackson was referring to the rule that when a
criminal defendant calls a character witness "to prove his good name" by means of his community
reputation, the witness can be cross-examined about specific acts of misconduct, and even arrests
of the defendant. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 191.
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correct, 112 the Court rushed by this evidentiary point in its haste to prevent a criminal defendant from abusing the exclusionary rule of the
fourth amendment. Federal and state courts have cited Walder as authority for the rule of evidence that neither the exclusionary rule nor

the Hitchcock rule prevents a party from using extrinsic proof to expose
falsehoods volunteered by an opponent's witness during direct exami-

nation." 3 The dual policy reasons supporting the Hitchcock rule in
this context, judicial economy and the avoidance of jury confusion,
4
were subordinated to the need to purge the trial process of perjury."

The most anomalous result of Walder from an evidentiary perspective is that it spawned a widely accepted rule that illegal evidence

may be used only when it contradicts the accused's direct testimony on
collateral matters. Walder was impeached with extrinsic, tainted evi-

dence on a matter collateral to the issue of his guilt in the case on
trial." 5 The Court stated in Walder that a defendant "must be free to

deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving
leave to the Government to introduce. . . evidence illegally secured by
it.116 Many federal courts concluded from this statement that a de-

fendant may not be contradicted by illegal evidence that bears directly
on his guilt or innocence.1

7

The courts, it seems, completely lost sight

112. The editor of the 1981 supplement to 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 15, at 94, in discussing Wader, states: "Mr. Justice Frankfurter's differentiation between the situation here
is not convincing. In both cases the evidence objected to
presented with that ofAgnello
involved credibility only; accordingly, the rule prohibiting contradiction on a collateral matter is
encountered. . . ." See Lee v. United States, 368 F.2d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Long before
Wader... the rules of evidence... did not countenance the impeachment of witnesses by
otherwise inadmissible evidence directed to collateral issues").
113. See notes 125-29 infra and accompanying text.
114. The remaining policy reason for prohibiting extrinsic, collateral contradictions--to avoid
unfairly surprising the witness with allegations of past misconduct, see J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 1002-obviously does not apply when the witness first raises the subject on direct.
115. Walder's past possession of narcotics was not offered nor was it admissible for any reason
other than its contradiction of Walder's direct testimony. See C. McCoRMici, supra note 2,
§ 178. Indeed, the trial court should have instructed the jury that the relevance of the "othercrimes evidence" was limited to the issue of the defendant's credibility. See, e.g., Jackson v.
United States, 311 F.2d 686, 689-90 (5th Cir. 1963).
116. 347 U.S. at 65.
117. E.g., Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court stated:
Since [Walder], we have held that an inadmissible statement can be used only when the
defendant makes "sweeping claims" that go far beyond the crime charged, is impeached
on a statement relating to "lawful proper acts" "collateral" to the issues before the jury,
or is questioned about "minor points." In such situations, impeachment of the defendant
affects only his credibility, since the truth of the impeaching statement does not itself
tend to establish guilt.
Id at 349 (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966); Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Burger, J.) ("Once Ithe defendant] goes beyond denial of the crime itself and testifies as to collateral matters he is under an
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of the Hitchcock rule. The illegality of the evidence made it more readily admissible for impeachment purposes than it would have been had
it not been unconstitutionally obtained. But the Hitchcock rule applies
irrespective of whether the contradicting evidence introduced on rebuttal was illegally seized. In fact, there is greater reason to exclude evidence when one considers the combination of the policies behind the
federal exclusionary rule and the Hitchcock rule.
The life of this "impeachment on collateral points only" anomaly
was summarily terminated in two brisk sentences by the Supreme
Court in Harrisv. New York. 1 8 Harris's exculpatory direct testimony
contradicted a statement, taken from him before he had been read his
Miranda rights,' 19 that directly implicated him in the crime for which

he was on trial. In upholding the prosecutor's use of the statement on
rebuttal, the Court noted:
It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters included
in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here was impeached as
to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes charged. We are
not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a
result different from that reached by the Court in Wader.120
Thus, after Harris,illegally obtained evidence may be used to contradict a defendant's testimony on both collateral and noncollateral matters so long as the testimony to be contradicted is not "smuggle[d]...
in on cross-examination,"' 2 1as it was inAgnello. For many courts, the
Waider and Harriscases crystallized a rule of evidence as well as a rule
of constitutional criminal procedure. When a criminal defendant
makes statements on direct examination that the prosecutor stands
ready to prove false, courts understandably apply Wader to allow the
prosecutor to contradict those statements with extrinsic evidence.' 22 If
the contradicting evidence is constitutionally obtained, then so much
the better. 123 Not once was the collateral-matter rule viewed as an impediment to impeachment on a collateral point raised on direct examiadded compulsion to tell the truth"). Contra, Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.
1968). See also Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the ConstitutionalExclusionary Rules,
73 COLuM. L. REv. 1476, 1489 (1973); Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained Edence-The Erosionof the Exclusionary Rule, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 706, 715 (1973).
118. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
119. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120. 401 U.S. at 225. Note that the author of the Harris decision, Chief Justice Burger, also
authored Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960), as a judge on the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. See note 117 supra.
121. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954).
122. See notes 149-50 infra and accompanying text.
123. See United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Surely our obligation [to
apply Walder within its prescribed limits] is not diminished by the circumstances that the evidence
here is untainted").
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nation, although the federal courts have otherwise applied the
124
Hitchcock rule with vigor.
Between the time of the Walder decision and the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 25 this sweeping-claims exception to the
collateral-impeachment rule received widespread judicial acceptance.
Of course, in several federal drug cases in which the facts were similar
to those in Walder, the exception was readily applied. 126 But Waider
and Harris were not limited to their facts. They were interpreted as

authorizing the use of evidence that is constitutionally infirm to "impeach exhorbitant [sic] testimonial claims volunteered by an accused on
trial." 27 Nevertheless, the courts adhered to a rigid distinction be124. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Allende, 486 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Banks, 475 F.2d 1367, 1368 & n.2
(5th Cir. 1973); Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d 222, 223 (10th Cir. 1960); Cwach v. United
States, 212 F.2d 520, 530 (8th Cir. 1954).
125. Waider, decided in 1954, preceded by 21 years the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975.
126. See United States v. Townes, 512 F.2d 1057, 1058 (6th Cir.) (defendant testified he had
never had anything to do with drugs; he was properly impeached with illegally seized evidence
that narcotics had been discovered in his trousers); cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846 (1975); United States
v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (defendant testified he had seen narcotics only on
television; he was properly impeached with evidence of an uncharged sale shortly before his arrest); United States v. Gonzalez, 491 F.2d 1202, 1204 (5th Cir. 1974) (the defendant denied on
direct having ever sold cocaine; he was properly impeached by the testimony of a government
witness with whom the defendant unsuccessfully had negotiated on the sale of half a kilogram of
cocaine); White v. United States, 317 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1963) (the defendant testified on
direct that he had never been "involved in" and had never sold narcotics; he was properly impeached by testimony of a witness to whom the defendant had previously sold drugs); Jackson v.
United States, 311 F.2d 686, 689-90 (5th Cir.) (defendant testified that he had nothing to do with
narcotics in the previous four years; he was properly impeached by testimony of narcotics agents
that defendant had stated to them he had recently transacted a narcotics deal and had a $50 a day
habit), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 850 (1963); Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 140 (9th Cir.)
(defendant testified that he had not seen any narcotics "whatsoever" in the last year and a half; he
was properly impeached by a witness who testified she had purchased narcotics from the defendant a "year and a half ago"), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
One is tempted to doubt whether the defendants in the above cases received adequate representation from their trial counsels, who obviously had not read Wader or Harris before putting
their clients on the stand.
127. United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See United States ex rel.
Walker v. Follette, 443 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1971). Follette, on the authority of Wader and
Harris,upheld the admission of two prior convictions obtained when the defendant did not have
benefit of counsel, to impeach the defendant's sweeping claim that he had never been convicted of
a crime. See also United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973) (illegal wiretap evidence
permitted to rebut defendant's sweeping claim); Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1964) (prosecution questions concerning illegally seized gambling paraphenalia permitted to impeach defendant's claim that she had never engaged in a numbers business); Smith v. United
States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (portions of defendant's indigency affadavit stating that a
witness was needed to establish an alibi defense to a rape charge permitted to impeach credibility
of defendant's testimony that prosecutrix had consented); United States v. Sing Kee, 250 F.2d 236
(2d Cir. 1957) (prosecutor permitted to show that the defendant invoked the fifth amendment in
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tween the contradiction of matters first raised on direct as opposed to
on cross-examination. 28 Agnello still had life and WaIder and Harris
did not affect the prohibition of contradiction of facts elicited during
cross. The California Supreme Court best stated the rationale for the
distinction: "[The] [d]efendant did not rely on the illegality of the impeaching evidence as a sword to commit perjury, but simply as a shield
against the consequences of concededly improper police practices."' 29
In these circumstances extrinsic contradiction is improper.
B. The Life of the Sweeping-Claims Exception Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the
courts have had to determine whether the Rules intended to continue
or terminate the widespread post-Walder practice of permitting extrinsic impeachment of sweeping claims. However, the rules and their
drafting history are inscrutable in this regard. The rules contain no
provision which states in a comprehensive way the means by which a
witness's credibility may be impeached.' 30 Only rules 608, 609, and 610
deal specifically with the subject, and they only treat impeachment by
attack on the witness's character and religious beliefs. Rule 613 clearly
assumes that a witness may be self-contradicted by extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement.' 3' However, that rule does not make
the admissibility of the statement dependent upon whether the matter
contradicted is collateral or noncollateral. Nowhere do the rules mention the collateral-matter rule or the words "collateral" and "uncolfront of the grand jury after the defendant testified at trial that his direct testimony was consistent
with what he had told the grand jury).
128. See United States v. Mariani, 539 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Blackshire,
538 F.2d 569 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 840 (1976); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138 (9th
Cir. 1974); White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965); accord,People v. Taylor,,8 Cal.
3d 174, 501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr.'350 (1972); People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 259 N.E.2d
727, 311 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1970). See also C. McCoRMicK, supra note 2, § 57; Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the ConstitutionalExclusionary Rules, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1476, 1485
(1973).
129. People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 185, 501 P.2d 918, 925, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350, 357 (1972).
130. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 312 (2d ed.
1977).
131. FED. R. Evl. 613 provides:
(a) Examining witnesses concerningpriorstatement. In examining a witness concerning
a prior inconsistent statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need
not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same shall
be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence ofpriorinconsistentstatement ofwitness. Extrinsic evidence of a
prior statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportufiity to
interrogate him thereon, or the interests ofjustice otherwise require. This provision does
not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2).
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lateral". However, there is an allusion to the sweeping-claims
exception to the collateral-matter rule in the drafting history of rule
609, which involves impeachment with prior convictions. The Report
of the Senate Committee states the following:
[T]he committee intends that notwithstanding this rule, a defendant's
misrepresentation regarding the existence or nature of prior convictions may be met by rebuttal evidence, including the record of such
prior convictions. Similarly, such records may be offered to rebut
representations made by the defendant regarding his attitude toward
or willingness to commit a general category of offense, although denials or other representations by the defendant regarding the specific
conduct which forms the basis of the charge against him shall not
make prior convictions admissible to rebut such statement.
In regard to either type of representation, of course, prior convictions may be offered in rebuttal only if the defendant's statement
is made in response to defense counsel's questions or is made gratuitously in the course of cross-examination. Prior convictions may not
be offered as rebuttal evidence if the prosecution has sought to cirquestions which elicit
cumvent the purpose of this rule by asking
132
such representations from the defendant.
Substitute the words "prior acts of misconduct not resulting in a
conviction" for "prior convictions" and "records" in this quote, and it
becomes an accurate statement of the federal case law concerning the
contradiction of sweeping claims following Walder. Obviously this
language reflects the Senate Committee's awareness of Walder and
Harrisand the impeachment practice they spawned. The Committee
was seeking to ensure that, the language of rule 609 would not be read
as preventing otherwise inadmissible prior convictions from being used
to contradict gratuitous "misrepresentations" by defendants. It would
seem clear, therefore, that the Senate Committee, at least, intended that
the contradiction of volunteered sweeping claims should continue
ss
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.1
Nevertheless, the absence of any more explicit recognition of the
sweeping-claims exception in the rules and their legislative history has
caused problems for courts faced with the sweeping-claim issue after
enactment of the rules. And despite the fact that the rules were not
intended to be a comprehensive restatement of the law of evidence for
132. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7051, 7061.

133. Conceivably this passage could be read as an attempt by the Senate Committee to restrict
to prior convictions the items ofproof that may be used to contradict a sweeping statement. However, no case or treatise reads the passage in this way. Moreover, the committee, no doubt, would
have been far more explicit if it had intended to discard an evidentiary doctrine sanctioned by the
Supreme Court.
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the federal courts, 134 many courts have looked to a specific rule or cluster of rules in an attempt to pull the sweeping-claims exception into
post-1975 practice. Before focusing on rule 607, which several courts
have seen as the passport for engrafting the exception into post-1975
trials, the major stumbling block to its survival must be examined.
Rule 608(b) 135 permits, among other things, a cross-examiner to
question a witness concerning specific instances of conduct which reflect adversely upon the witness's character for truthfulness.136 However, except for prior convictions admissible under rule 609, the crossexaminer must take the witness's answers and cannot prove prior conduct by extrinsic evidence. 37 Thus, although rule 608(a) permits the
introduction of extrinsic proof in the form of reputation or opinion evidence to attack credibility, 38 rule 608(b), in effect, declares that specific
134. See United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The Evidence
Code does not attempt to write a catalog of all the rules which govern evidence that can be used to
impeach a witness. Rather, the code only attempts to lay down a few specific rules."). See also S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 130, at 313-14.
135. FED. R. Evim. 608(b) provides:
Spec#fc instancesof conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
136. A witness's credibility may be called into doubt not only by showing bias or limited
opportunity to observe, but also by demonstrating simply that the witness is not a trustworthy or
believable person. This attack is on the witness's character. There are three forms that an attack
on character may take: (1) the witness's community reputation for untrustworthiness; (2) an individual's personal opinion about the witness's believability; and (3) specific instances of misconduct. See FED. R. EvID. 608. Evidence of prior misconduct is a method of circumstantially
discrediting a witness by showing that the witness has demonstrated by past actions that he is not
the type of person who should be believed. See C. McCoRMICK, upra note 2, §§ 41-43.
The two major questions the law must determine about this last type of "character" evidence
are (a) what types of prior misconduct may be put before the factflnder, and (b) in what manner
may they be introduced. The answer to the first question depends on how strictly relevant the trait
of veracity must be to the misconduct involved. Generally, the prior misconduct introduced to
demonstrate the witness's bad character must be probative of the trait of untruthfulness. Thus,
conduct showing the witness to be aggressive and violent is not admissible, whereas prior acts of
fraud and deceit are admissible. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 42. Before the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the majority of the federal courts forbade all manner of inquiry
into prior misconduct not resulting in a conviction when the inquiry's sole purpose was to discredit a witness. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 130, at 312. The rules limit inquiry,
when permitted, to cross-examination; extrinsic testimony is not allowed to prove the misconduct.
FED. R. EViD. 608(b); C. McComicK, supra note 2, § 42. If the witness falsely denies engaging
in previous misconduct, even an eyewitness to the misconduct may not contradict him.
137. See FED. R. EvD. 608(b).
138. FED. R. EvID. 608(a) provides:
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instances of conduct offered for this purpose are collateral matters per139
mitting no extrinsic proof.

Problems arise when, in the typical case, a testifying defendant

makes a sweeping denial on direct examination of some prior misconduct. 140 Of course, the sweeping-claims exception would permit con-

tradiction by extrinsic evidence of prior misconduct even if the
misconduct were collateral to the material issues at trial. But the first
sentence of rule 608(b) appears to say that such extrinsic rebuttal evi-

dence would not be admissible, even if the defendant denied the misconduct on direct examination. Thus, Circuit Judge Kennedy in his

dissent in United States v. Batts (Batts 1)141 stated unequivocally that
rule 608(b) had extinguished the common law sweeping-claims excep-

tion. 142 And in United States v. Burchina1 143 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit intimated that rule 608(b) prohibited attempts by the
Opinion and reputationevidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise.
139. The reasons that justify the rule prohibiting extrinsic testimony concerning prior misconduct to impeach a witness are essentially the same as those that support the collateral-impeachment rule of Hitchcock. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 979.
It should be clear that the Hitchcock rule against collateral impeachments is not necessarily
overlapped by rule 608(b). The Hitchcock rule excludes extrinsic proof offered to contradict a
witness on a point collateral to any material issue in the case. The collateral matter exclusion is
not limited, as is rule 608(b), to prior conduct by the witness, and may extend to any external fact,
even the conduct of a third person. See, eg., State v. Oswalt,_62 Wash. 2d 118, 381 P.2d 617
(1963). Under Hitchcock, the only criterion is whether the proof of the external fact contradicts
the witness's testimony on a material point, or is otherwise admissible by that party apart from the
contradiction. On the other hand, rule 608(b) does not specifically address impeachment by contradiction. Character evidence in the form of specific conduct offered to impeach a witness's credibility is inadmissible under the rule regardless of whether the witness has testified concerning the
matter.
More often than not the extrinsic evidence would contradict the witness's testimony and also
prove a prior act which is reflective of the witness's character for untruthfulness.. Here the Hitchcock rule and rule 608(b) overlap. It is understandable then that federal courts which had embraced the bastard sweeping-claims rule prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in July, 1975, since then have had to confront the question whether rule 608(b) has eliminated it.
140. Recall, for example, that in Waider the defendant volunteered on direct that he had never
possessed or sold narcotics. The rebuttal evidence was that Walder had indeed possessed drugs in
the past. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
141. 558 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1977) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), opinion withdrawn and new
opinion substituted, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
142. 558 F.2d at 522 n.6 (Kennedy, J., dissenting): "Before the enactment of the Federal
Rules, we permitted extrinsic evidence on rebuttal to prove the falsity of a witness' statement on
direct. [Citing WaIder and other cases.] In light of the express dictates of rule 608(b), this common law rule of evidence has no continued validity in the federal courts." In his dissent in the
revised opinion Judge Kennedy adhered to this position. See 573 F.2d at 604 n.l.
143. 657 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1981).
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defense to introduce extrinsic evidence that a government witness was
continuing to deal in drugs after the charged conspiracy had ended,
contrary to his testimony on direct examination. 144
But this view is mistaken. Despite the misleadingly broad language of the rule, 145 its function is quite narrow. Rule 608(b) is intended, along with rule 609, to govern the permissible scope of
impeachment of a witness's credibility with the third of the three types
of character evidence: reputation, opinion, and specific conduct (including prior convictions). This limitation excludes extrinsic evidence
only when the sole purpose of the proof is to demonstrate by means of
specific instances of conduct that the witness's character is such as to
render him or her untrustworthy under oath.' 46 The rule does not prohibit extrinsic evidence offered to impeach the witness's credibility by
one of the noncollateral modes of impeachment.1 47 Thus, if the specific
instance of conduct would also demonstrate a witness's bias for, or
prejudice against a party 14to8 the suit, then extrinsic proof of it is not
precluded by rule 608(b).
144. The court was less than clear on this point: "The question is arguably probative of [the
witness's] truthfulness because [he] had earlier testified that he last sold marijuana in December
... ." Id at 994. The court continued: "However, even if [he] had been questioned about and
denied subsequent drug dealings the defense could not under Rule 608(b) offer any extrinsic evidence of such dealings." Id
145. For example, the rule provides: "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, [offered]
for thepurpose of attacking..

.

his credibility, other than a conviction of crime. . . , may not be

proved by extrinsic evidence." FED. R EVID. 608(b).
146. Of course, where cross-examination is permitted under rule 608(b) into the prior conduct,
and the prior conduct is denied by the witness, the rebuttal evidence also proves that the witness
lied under oath on cross-examination. However, this additional purpose does not create sufficient
reasons to permit the extrinsic contradiction.
147. Of course, prior conduct offered to prove, for example, intent, motive, and plan under the
second sentence of rule 404(b) must also be distinguished.
148. In United States v. Ruiz Rios, 579 F.2d 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1978), the court spoke of "[t]he
'bias' exception to the strictures of Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 609(a)." This statement
demonstrates a fundamental confusion concerning the scope of rule 608. Bias evidence is not
character evidence, but several federal trial and appellate courts have failed to understand this
distinction. In United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 905
(1980), the trial court excluded extrinsic evidence offered to show that a government witness may
have had reason to believe that his testifying in the instant case would cause him to receive lenient
treatment in a pending, unrelated case. Although it affirmed the conviction, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit accurately observed that rule 608(b)'s proscription of extrinsic proof does
not apply to proof tending to show bias. Id at 46. See United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535,
550 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102,
1106 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720,722 (2d Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Brewer,
521 F.2d 556, 562 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1975).
In United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,430 U.S. 933 (1977), the
court reached the remarkable conclusion that evidence offered by the defense to show that two
major prosecution witnesses directed threats and violence toward the defendants was inadmissible
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Notwithstanding the confusion wrought by the language of rule
608(b), the more perceptive federal court opinions have held that not
only the collateral-matter rule of Hichcock 149 but also its sweepingclaims exception have survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 150 Rule 607 is the rule most frequently used to justify the

continued existence of the sweeping-claims exception. 15' At first, this
justification is difficult to understand because rule 607 merely provides:
under Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 608 and 609. 545 F.2d at 622. It is difficult to conceive of
stronger evidence of witness bias.
149. For example, in United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1979), the court
stated:
[We believe that Rule 608(b) should not stand as a bar to the admission of evidence

introduced to contradict, and which the jury might find disproves, a witness's testimony
as to material issues of the case.

The fact that the business records might have the incidental effect ofproving [the government witness] a liar does not affect their admissibility as relevant evidence.
See also United States v. Cole, 617 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3055 (1981);
United States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); United
States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carrasquillo, 412 F. Supp. 289
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202, 211 (8th Cir. 1975). However, some courts have
incorrectly ruled, in effect, that rule 608(b) prohibits extrinsic contradiction on noncollateral issues. In United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1975), the court affirmed the decision of
the trial court, which barred attempts by the defendant to put on testimony that the government
witnesses were drug addicts. Although the appellate court correctly observed that evidence of
current drug use was relevant to possible impairment of the witness's ability accurately to recall
and relate facts, it went on to declare cryptically that the application of rule 608(b) to exclude the
evidence "will not work any injustice." d at 631. Because the evidence was not offered to impeach the witnesses' character but rather to demonstrate a possible infirmity of their testimony,
rule 608(b) was inapplicable to the question. See also Marshak v. Green, 89 F.R.D. 637 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). In Marshak the court ruled that rule 608(b) prevented the admission of extrinsic evidence
that the plaintiff and his attorney attempted to bribe and coerce a witness to commit perjury at
trial. Again, rule 608(b) applies to attempts to show noncredible character, not to possible admissions by conduct. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 42, 271.
150. The following cases have upheld the proposition that a false claim made on direct examination may be rebutted with extrinsic evidence: United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 595 (9th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Herman
589 F.2d 1194, 1196 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States v. Benedetto,
571 F.2d 1246, 1250 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 203 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 571 F.2d 573 (3d Cir.
1977). The following cases held that the admission of extrinsic rebuttal evidence to contradict a
witness's testimony on cross-examination was error, many of the courts clearly implying that if the
testimony rebutted had been either elicited on direct examination or volunteered on cross, then
the impeachment would have been proper. United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1979),
rep'd, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 930 (1977); United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
McFadyen-Snider, 552 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
151. See, eg., United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 682 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Miah, 433 F. Supp. 259, 265-66
(E.D. Pa.), aft'd,571 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Carrasquillo, 412 F. Supp. 289, 292
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
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"The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including
the party calling him."1 52 Nothing in the Advisory Committee notes
leads one to believe that rule 607 is even remotely connected to the
sweeping-claims exception. A closer reading of some of the courts' citations of authority for this puzzling conclusion reveals its likely source.
Several courts cite Weinstein and Berger's highly influential treatise on
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Weinstein's Evidence, to support their
conclusion. In the section discussing rule 607, the authors decided, for
less than obvious reasons, to discuss together the collateral-matter rule,
contradiction of matters first raised on direct, and impeachment with
1 53
illegally obtained evidence.
Regardless of whether one should infer the federal practice governing impeachment by extrinsic contradiction on a collateral matter
from a specific Federal Rule of Evidence, or whether it exists somewhere in the lacunae of the rules, there is no doubt that the federal
courts, and many state courts, permit such contradiction when the matter arises as a sweeping claim on direct examination. A relatively early
appellate decision that bridges the gap between pre-rules case law and
post-rules adjudication is UnitedStates v. Benedetto.154 Benedetto was
a federal meat inspector prosecuted for accepting bribes from four meat
processors. When the defendant took the stand he not only denied accepting any gratuities from the government's witnesses, but also declared that he had never accepted any bribes from anyone.1 55 On
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant if he had accepted a bribe from a fellow employee of one of the defense witnesses.
After the defendant denied the allegation, the prosecutor called the employee in rebuttal to testify that he had made periodic cash payments to
56
Benedetto.1
The government sought to justify the rebuttal evidence as relevant
to prove the knowledge and intent of the defendant, as well as his iden152. FED. R. EviD. 607.
153. See 3 J. WmNSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

607[02], 607[051-[06],

607[09] (Supp. 1981). A later treatise, S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 130, at 301, 30405, also discusses impeachment with illegally seized evidence and prior inconsistent statements
under the heading of rule 607. The latest treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with
impeachment by contradiction and the collateral-matter rule under rule 611. 3 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 71, § 343 (1979). The collateral-matter rule is also treated under rule 403. 2
id § 129 (1978). Extrinsic impeachment of matters raised on direct is discussed under rule 608, 3
id §§ 306, 307, and at I id § 11 (1977), covering rule 103 and the doctrine of curative

admissibility.
154. 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978).

155. Id at 1248.
156. Id
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tity because it showed a continuing plan under rule 404(b). 157 The
court rejected these contentions, holding that the intent and knowledge
of the defendant were not in issue at the trial, and that the evidence of

other crimes was not unusual and distinctive enough to show identity
through a common plan. 158 The court also rejected the government's

argument that the admission of evidence of other crimes was legitimized by the defendant's introduction of character testimony that he
had not taken bribes. 159

In the court's view, however, the defendant's testimony on direct
examination that he had never taken bribes from anybody ultimately

tipped the balance in favor of the government: "Once a witness (especially a defendant-witness) testifies as to any specific fact on direct testimony, the trial court has broad discretion to admit extrinsic evidence
tending to contradict the specific statement, even if such statement con-

cerns a collateral matter in the case."' 160 The court itlso noted that Benedetto's sweeping denial was "closely intertwined with the central
157. Rule 404(b) states in full:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a

person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).

158. 571 F.2d at 1249. The court's holding that like-crimes evidence was not admissible as
part of the government's case under rule 404(b) amounts to a finding that the evidence was
collateral.
159. Id As the court points out, the trial court erroneously admitted the defendant's "good
character" evidence. The appellate court noted that, under FED. R. EviD. 405(a), a defendant's
good character may be proved only by reputation and opinion evidence. Reference to specific
instances of conduct may be made only on cross-examination. d at 1250. Although the exact
phrase was not mentioned in the court's summary of the government's contentions on appeal, the
prosecution's arguments sound very much like a request that the court apply the doctrine of "curative admissibility" to uphold the introduction of the evidence. See text accompanying notes 71-76
supra. Without explanation, the court stated: "That the defense improperly attempts to establish
defendant's good character by reference to specific good acts did not justify the prosecution's use
of testimony concerning bad acts either in its direct case or in rebuttal." 571 F.2d at 1250. The
court supported this statement with a citation to United States v. Betio, 324 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.
1963), in which the eno court commented in a similar context:
[I]t makes little sense to insist that once incompetent evidence is erroneously admitted,
the error must of necessity be compounded by 'opening the door" so wide that rebutting
collateral, inflammatory and highly prejudicial evidence may enter the minds of the jurors. In short, a small advantage improperly obtained does not compel the exaction of a
gross disadvantage in penalty, particularly where a tarnished verdict is the inevitable
result.
Id at 588-89. However, in Beno, in which an Internal Revenue agent charged with soliciting a
bribe improperly introduced good-character evidence through specific-acts testimony, the government's rebuttal evidence addressed matters totally foreign to the disputed issues, showing that the
defendant had been arrested for reckless driving and forgery of tax returns. Id at 585-86.
160. 571 F.2d at 1250.
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issue" in the case,16' implying that although the rebuttal evidence concerned a collateral issue, it was not "too collateral." Therefore, the impeachment by contradiction was acceptable. In support of its holding,
the court cited, inter alia,162 Federal Rule of Evidence 607, explaining
that the rule "appears to allow the continuation of federal practice in
admitting extrinsic evidence to impeach specific errors or falsehoods in
1 63
a witness's direct testimony, subject to rule 403 considerations."
The court did not mention rule 608(b),164 which bars extrinsic evidence of specific acts of misconduct that do not result in a conviction
from being offered to attack credibility. If the court had found that
either rule 608(b) or the collateral-matter rule applied, then the prosecutor would have been bound by Benedetto's denial on cross-examination that he did not take bribes from the government's rebuttal witness.
It can be argued that rule 608(b) does not apply because the specificmisconduct evidence was not introduced as character evidence per se.
Rather, the prosecutor offered it merely to contradict a fact to which
the defendant freely testified on direct examination. Even if this argument is accepted, the rebuttal evidence runs afoul of the collateral-matter rule. The court in Benedetto correctly believed that evidence of
crimes not charged in the indictment is collateral. 65 Thus the Benedetto court upheld the specific contradiction of a witness's testimony on
a collateral matter on the basis of the prior federal practice derived
from Wader. The court missed an opportunity to examine the rationale for the practice within the framework of the newly enacted Federal
Rules of Evidence. The sweeping-claims exception was simply incorporated into the rules via rule 607, through the implied discretion of the
courts to do what is fair during the trial.
Although the courts continue to justify extrinsic collateral impeachment in the same terms that they used before the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, by simply defining matters
raised on direct as not collateral, 66 or by concluding that the volunteered falsehood "opened the door,"' 67 these terms are purely con161. Id
162. The court also cited Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), see notes 94-117 supra
and accompanying text, and United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1963), see note 159
surra.

163. 571 F.2d at 1250 n.7.
164. For the text of the rule, see note 39 supra.

165. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
166. See, ag., United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
167. See, eg., United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Miah, 433 F. Supp. 259, 265 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 571 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1977). C. United States v.
Wright, 542 F.2d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977) ("Having denied that

Vol.- 1982:61]

SWEEPING-CLAIMS EXCEPTION

clusory and beg justification. Nevertheless, the cases do evince a
"sense" of the judges' main concern-the jury. It is not just that perjury may go unmasked, but rather that the jury may be misled. The
rules of evidence are the products of compromise, wherein competing
interests are juggled to achieve a precarious balance. Not all relevant
evidence is admitted. Not all falsehoods are permitted to be pursued.
Many of the rules are based upon a judgment, or simply fear, that the
jury may be sidetracked from their main pursuit or stampeded into another if certain evidence is admitted. Hence courts are willing to hold
the collateral-matter exclusion in abeyance when they think it necessary to set the jury straight. This notion is reflected most clearly in
cases in which the courts have justified the admission of rebuttal evidence to correct a "mis-painted picture" gratuitously drawn by a witness.1 68 Because the collateral-matter rule is a judge-made rule created
largely to assist juries by expediting trials and minimizing confusion,
judges have the discretion to withhold the rule when its operation
would foster rather than dispel confusion.
But a continued and careful balancing is necessary. Often the rebuttal evidence may overcompensate for the imbalance sought to be
offset. Other-crimes evidence may be too potent. To allow rebuttal of
testimony elicited on cross-examination is likely to open a hole in the
carefully constructed barrier against the use of misconduct evidence to
show propensity. 169 Thus, even where 'courts have embraced the
sweeping-claims exception, the more perceptive of them have recognized that it is subject to the over-arching considerations of rule 403.170
Courts need not allow every erroneous statement on a collateral point
to be corrected with extrinsic counterproof. But some points should be,
particularly when it is fairly evident that the witness has deliberately
lied about a matter in which he or she could not be mistaken, and the
fabrication, if left uncorrected, might seriously mislead the jury. Certainly the jury, upon hearing a criminal defendant volunteer, for example, that he has never been in trouble before, expects contradiction of
that fact if it is not true. And if no rebuttal is heard, it is reasonable, if
any such conversation took place [on direct], he cannot now complain that testimony reflecting
upon his truthfulness was admitted on rebuttal").
168. See United States v. Batts (Batts II), 573 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
859 (1978); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 203 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 588 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir.
1978) (the defendant's direct testimony "plainly sought to convey to the jury. . . that the defendant was an.honorable public servant who had never received a bribe").
169. See United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 681 (3rd Cir. 1979); FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
170. See, ag., United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 595 (9th Cir: 1981); United States v.
Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1978).
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not inevitable, for the jury to conclude that this is the defendant's first
scrape with the law. Few would deny that such a conclusion, rightly or
171
wrongly, would influence their decision.
C. The Sweeping-Claims Exception After United States v. Havens.
The injection of extrinsic rebuttal into the trial as an antidote for
perjury is not justified by the presence of perjury alone. How the perjury got into the trial is important. Because the presentation of contradicting proof may itself have serious destabilizing side-effexts on the
trial, the rebuttal must be avoided until the witness who caused the
problem in the first place has literally asked for it. Permitting the crossexaminer to maneuver the witness into testifying falsely about embarrassing collateral matters is tantamount to allowing the cross-examiner
to administer the antidote whenever he desires. 172 Hence, the courts
insist that sweeping claims be volunteered on direct or cross-examination before the exception is permitted to operate. It is. in this context
1 73
that the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Havens
must be scrutinized. There is a danger that courts may read Havens as
eliminating the dichotomy between matters elicited on direct and those
elicited on cross-examination by failing to focus upon the distinction
between collateral and noncollateral matters. Havens should not disturb this direct-cross distinction when extrinsic evidence is offered to
rebut false testimony on a collateral issue.
Havens was arrested after arriving at the Miami, Florida, airport
from Peru. Shortly before Havens's a'rrest, airport customs agents discovered a man named McLeroth, who also arrived from Peru and was
carrying cocaine in makeshift pockets sewn into his T-shirt. McLeroth
implicated Havens in the smuggling scheme. Federal narcotics agents
171. The author of this article has presented criminal cases to many grand juries. During or
after presentation of the occurrence witnesses, the one question invariably asked by the jurors was,
"Has he ever been in trouble befoie?" For the same reasons which underlie Federal Rule 404(b),
the question would always go unanswered, but the natural desire on the part of the jury to obtain
this information is understandable.
172. See authorities cited in note 169 supra. To use an overly simplistic example, assume a
defendant accused of theft denies the crime on the stand. If the prosecutor is allowed to ask on
cross-examination, based on good faith information, whether the defendant tortures stray cats as a
hobby, it is very likely that, even if true, the defendant will deny it. If he admits it, he may harm
himself in the eyes of thejury. If he denies it, he will be lying, but about something totally foreign
to the case being tried. Faced with this dilemma, it is more likely that the defendant will avoid
certain ignominy and deny the allegation, hoping that the prosecutor is bluffing and- has no evidence awaiting. If the prosecutor is permitted to contradict this falsehood, then every inadmissible and prejudicial fact about a witness capable of being proved could be injected into a trial at
the whim and caprice of the prosecutor.
173. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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arrested Havens and searched his luggage without a warrant. There
they found a medium sized T-shirt from which pieces were cut that
corresponded to the patches sewn onto McLeroth's shirt to make pockets. McLeroth pleaded guilty to one of three counts in the indictment
and agreed to testify against Havens. Prior to trial, the court suppressed the T-shirt found in Havens's luggage.174
At trial, McLeroth testified that he, Havens, and others were involved in a cocaine smuggling scheme. 175 He described the first trip,
17 6
claiming that Havens had taped bags of cocaine to McLeroth's body.
On the trip that ended with their arrests, McLeroth claimed, Havens
had supplied him with the altered T-shirt and had sewn the bags of
177
cocaine into the pockets.
Havens denied knowledge of McLeroth's smuggling activities, and
his direct testimony continued as follows:
Q. And you heard Mr. McLeroth testify earlier as to something
to the effect that this material was taped or draped around his
body and so on, you heard that testimony?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you ever engage in that kind of activity with Mr. McLeroth and Augusto or Mr. McLeroth and anyone else on that
fourth visit to Lima, Peru?
178
A. I did not.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Havens if his testimony was that he "had nothing to do with the sewing of the cotton
swatches to make pockets on that tee shirt." 179 When Havens agreed,
the prosecutor asked him whether, when he came through customs, he
had in his luggage any T-shirts smaller than those he normally wore.
This question prompted a defense objection that the impeachment was
improper because the matter of the T-shirt was not mentioned on direct. The judge responded, "It does not have to be covered on direct.
If he denies something under oath, which is-."180 The prosecutor then
confronted Havens with the illegally seized T-shirt and asked if it had
been in his suitcase when he was arrested. Havens replied, "Not to my
knowledge. No."' 81 On rebuttal, the prosecutor called an agent who
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id at 621-22.
United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
Brief for Petitioner at 4.
592 F.2d at 850.
446 U.S. at 622-23.
592 F.2d at 852.
446 U.S. at 623.
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described how he found the T-shirt in the defendant's luggage and testified that Havens had stated that the shirt belonged to MeLeroth.
Over objection, the T-shirt was admitted into evidence for the purpose
82
of impeaching the defendant.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, after reviewing the
Agnello-WaIder-Harris line of cases and two cases from other circuits,183 rejected the trial court's view that any denial, either on direct

or on cross-examination, opens the door to rebuttal with tainted evidence.' 84 The court examined Havens's direct testimony to determine
whether the rebuttal evidence contradicted anything said there, and
noted that the defendant's counsel "did not ask Havens anything at all
about a T-shirt, nor was he asked about the contents of his luggage."1 85
Therefore, because the impeaching evidence was predicated on
Havens's cross-examination testimony, the trial court erred under
Agnello and Waider.
The Supreme Court agreed that the government's rebuttal evidence did not "squarely contradict the defendant's testimony on direct
examination."' 8 6 Nevertheless, it reversed. In a 5-4 decision, 187 Justice
White reduced the holdings ofAgnello, Wader, and Harristo a single
proposition: "[W]hen defendants testify, they must testify truthfully or
suffer the consequences," 188 regardless of whether their testimony is on
direct or cross-examination. The constitutional exclusionary rule does
not impede the impeachment process. 18 9
Although Agnello represented a major obstacle to reversal, the
Court did not explicitly overrule it. The majority opinion finessed
Agnello by redefining the concept of "smuggling in" the opportunity to
impeach during cross-examination. Justice White pointed to the language inAgnello noting that Agnello had said nothing on direct examination to justify cross-examination regarding the illegally seized
182. Id
183. United States v. Mariani, 539 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d

138 (9th cir. 1974).
184. 592 F.2d at 851. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
185. 592 F.2d at 852.
186. 446 U.S. at 621. The Court stated that the single issue presented by the Havens appeal

was "whether evidence suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure may nevertheless
be used to impeach a defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, where the evidence does not squarely contradict the defendant's testimony on direct examination." Id
187. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens dissented, agreeing that the decision did
not correctly follow precedent. Justices Brennan and Marshall went on to condemn the erosion of
the exclusionary rule. See id at 629.

188. 446 U.S. at 626.
189. Id at 627.
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evidence. 190 Justice White then redefined the WaIder definition of
Agnello, and stated thatAgnello was merely a case in which the "crossexamination [had] too tenuous a connection with any subject opened
upon direct examination to permit impeachment by tainted evidence." 9 1 Therefore if the questions on cross-examination, the answers to which contradict reliable, though tainted, evidence, "would
have been suggested to a reasonably competent cross-examiner by
Havens's direct testimony, they were not 'smuggled in.' 1192 The contradicting evidence did not involve a collateral matter; the Court held
that Havens's denial on direct that he had "ever engage[d] in that kind
of activity with Mr. McLeroth,"' 93 was tantamount to a denial of his
having anything to do with altering McLeroth's T-shirt. Therefore,
Havens's direct testimony reasonably suggested cross-examination
about the T-shirt McLeroth was wearing, and about the cut-up coun194
terpart found in Havens's suitcase.
Havens is more similar to Harris than it is to Waider from the
point of view of collateral and noncollateral impeachment. In Harris,
as in Havens, the impeaching evidence was directly probative of the
defendant's guilt, and would have been allowed in on the merits during
the government's case-in-chief but for its unconstitutional taint. In
Walder, however, the tainted rebuttal evidence was inadmissible during the government's case-in-chief for evidentiary reasons as well as for
constitutional reasons. Walder's unrelated drug possession charge two
years before his trial was inadmissible under the rule that forbids evidence of prior specific acts to prove the propensity to commit similar
acts.' 95 Walder's general denial on direct examination of ever having
possessed drugs swept away both the constitutional and evidentiary
barriers to the admission of the evidence, at least for impeachment purposes. The Supreme Court found Havens's cross-examination denial
sufficient to overcome the constitutional barrier to the admission of the
tainted evidence. If the contradiction is noncollateral, it makes no difference whether the testimony contradicted is elicited on direct or on
cross-examination. Therefore, the Supreme Court's holding in Havens
190. Id at 625. The reference is to the following language in Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 35 (1925): "In his direct examination, Agnello was not asked and did not testify concerning the [illegally seized] can of cocaine .... He did nothing to waive his constitutional protection
or to justify cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the

search."
191.
192.
193.
194.

446 U.S. at 625.
Id
Id at 628.
Id

195. See FED.R. Evl. 404(b); C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 42.
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that "a defendant's statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are
subject to otherwiseproperimpeachment. . . albeit by evidence that has
been illegally obtained,"1 96 is consistent with evidence law. Absent the
constitutional exclusionary rule, the impeachment was "otherwise
proper," notwithstanding the lack of a sweeping claim during direct
testimony.
But Havens should not be read to eliminate the need for a sweeping claim on direct examination when the rebuttal evidence concerns a
collateral matter. Although the Court removed the constitutional barrier to the admission of such evidence, it did not lift the ban on collateral impeachment with extrinsic proof, 197 for it stated that the
impeachment must be "otherwise proper."' 98 As the substantial weight
of federal case law now holds, there must be a sweeping claim on direct
before extrinsic impeachment on a collateral matter is permitted.
Havens does not disturb this doctrine, for the matter rebutted in that
case was noncollateral. Therefore, from an evidentiary point of view,
Agnello still has vitality. The Supreme Court reads Agnello as involving extrinsic impeachment on a collateral matter raised first on crossexamination. 9 9 In such instances, the impeachment of Agnello apart
from the constitutional exclusion was not "otherwise proper." It
amounted to collateral impeachment with extrinsic evidence absent a
sweeping claim to justify the contradiction.
The following diagram illustrates how the major cases can be
viewed from the perspective of extrinsic contradiction:
196. 446 U.S. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
197. The Court stated:
[W]e do not understand the District Court to have indicated that the Government's ques-

tion, the answer to which is sought to be impeached, need not be proper cross-examination in the first instance. The Court of Appeals did not suggest that either the crossexamination or the impeachment of Havens would have been improper absent the use of

illegally seized evidence, and we 'anot accept respondent's suggestions that because of

the illegal search and seizure, the Government's questions about the T-shirt were im-

proper cross-examination.
Id at 628.
198. Id at 627.
199. The Court stated in Havens: "The implication of Wader is that Agnello was a case of
cross-examination having too tenuous a connection with any subject opened upon direct examination to permit impeachment by tainted evidence." Id at 625.
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The Matter First Raised on

The Matter Is
Collateral
Noncollateral

Direct

Cross

Contradiction Permitted

Contradiction Not Permitted

(Walder)

(Agnello)

Contradiction Permitted

Contradiction Permitted

(Harris)

(Havens)

This way of viewing the cases demonstrates why Agnello survives
Havens. Otherwise the exception will have swallowed the rule. Indeed, if the collateral-matter rule has any meaning after Havens,
Agnello must stand for the proposition that a prosecutor may not introduce extrinsic rebuttal evidence, tainted or untainted, elicited for the
first time on cross-examination to contradict the testimony of a defendant on a collateral matter.
The Supreme Court in Walder correctly stated, as a matter of evidence law, that the impeaching evidence was admissible only to undermine the defendant's credibility. 20° This conclusion follows because
the impeaching evidence of prior criminal conduct was unrelated to the
trial charges. Such evidence has only one other possible use and this
use is impermissible. Unless the evidence is restricted to the question
of his credibility as a witness, evidence of unrelated crimes may be used
by the jury as proof of the defendant's bad character, that is, his disposition or propensity to commit crime. And if they conclude that he has
such a propensity, they may convict him although the other evidence of
guilt is insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 1 Consequently, the courts are on firm ground in limiting tainted other-crimes
evidence to impeaching credibility when the evidence is collateral to
the issues at trial.
Noncollateral contradicting evidence, like that in Harris and
Havens, is offered to contradict the testimony of a witness on a material
point. The evidence is admitted both to impeach by specific error, and
to disprove substantively the point made by the previous witness.20 2 If
the defendant opens the door, and thus removes the exclusionary rule's
barrier, the evidence should come in for-whatever purposes the rules of
evidence permit. For example, in Havens the rebuttal evidence directly
connected the defendant to the crime. Once the constitutional exclusion of the tainted evidence was lifted as a result of Havens's testimony,
the evidence should have been treated in the same manner as any other
200. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
201. See C. McCoRMicK, supra note 2, § 190.
202. See 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 71,

§ 343.
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evidence that contradicts the testimony of a witness on a material point,
namely, to prove or to disprove that material fact, as well as to impeach
the witness's credibility by specific contradiction. 203
In other words, the sweeping-claims exception is a rule of evidence, not merely a waiver of the protections of the constitutional exclusionary rule. And as a rule of evidence, it should operate to its
fullest extent. It begs the question -to argue that constitutionally
tainted, noncollateral evidence should not be used for substantive purposes even after the defendant voluntarily opens the door. The
Supreme Court has stated that the sweeping admonition of Silerthorne
Lumber Co. v. United StateS2°4-that illegally seized evidence cannot
be used at all-has been limited.205 Silverthorne'sprohibition has been
modified to mean that tainted evidence can never be used on the merits, but this distinction is artificial in that it has not been adequately
explained. Once the prosecutor is allowed to "toss the skunk into the
jury box," it is fantasy to expect the jury not to smell it. But more
importantly, the Supreme Court currently evaluates every ramification
of the exclusionary rule to determine its deterrent effect. If the exclusion of evidence from a certain portion of the trial does not appreciably
advance the goal of deterring illegal police behavior, then courts trim
away that aspect of the rule.20 6 Elimination of the impeachment-only
restriction on the use of illegal evidence directly relevant to the defendant's guilt hardly will spawn an increase in constitutional abuses by the
police. The prosecutor will continue to be prohibited from introducing
the evidence until the defendant causes the exclusionary rule to be
lifted. Elimination of the impeachment-only restriction will not diminish the principal deterrent effect of the rule, which arises from the exclusion of evidence from the prosecutor's case-in-chief.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The introduction of extrinsic testimony to contradict an adverse
witness's sworn testimony can be a critical event in a trial. It can
change a jury's entire outlook on a witness's testimony and, ultimately,
the merits of the case presented by the party who originally called the
203. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624-28 (1980).
204. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
205. E.g.; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See Pitler, "The Fruitofthe Poisonous Tree" Revisitedand Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579 (1968).

206. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence seized incident to a valid arrest under an ordinance later declared unconstitu-

tional); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness summoned to testify before grand
jury may not refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search).

See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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witness. When the point of testimony on which the witness is to be
specifically contradicted is collateral, the Hitchcock rule recognizes that
the dangers of confusion of issues, surprise, and wasting time arise.
And when the contradicting evidence reveals prior misconduct of the
witness, the law recognizes the danger that the jury may misuse the
207
evidence.
Since the WaIder decision, the courts have embraced an exception
to the prohibition on extrinsic impeachment on collateral matters. The
courts will ignore or endure problems of time, confusion, and surprise
when the sweeping collateral testimony is apparently false, advantageous to the witness or his proponent, and initially raised during his
direct examination. Indeed, trial courts have permitted collateral contradiction even when it brings to the trial the additional prejudice inherent in other-crimes evidence. Courts of appeals have ceased
reversing cases in which the trial judge permits this kind of erosion of
the collateral-matter rule; instead they rule that trial judges have the
discretion to admit this impeaching evidence.208
This erosion of the collateral-matter rule reflects a more permissive attitude among modem jurists toward what the jury should hear.
Certainly, a flat prohibition of all extrinsic impeachment testimony not
strictly material to the disputed issues, although avoiding the aforementioned dangers, can deprive the factfinders of valuable information. 209 Appellate judges no doubt realize this consequence, and
recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to balance the likely
costs against the possible gains resulting from the admission of certain
evidence.210
Added to these considerations are the unique features of a criminal trial. Judges permit collateral impeachment more frequently in
criminal prosecutions than in civil trials. Perhaps the issue simply
arises more often in criminal trials. The higher stakes of a criminal
trial--social and moral stigma and the possible loss of liberty-may
compel witnesses to overstate testimony and succumb to the temptation
to make a sweeping claim or denial. However, this does not account
for the increased permissiveness of the courts toward collateral impeachment of criminal defendants. The criminal defendant is uniquely
prejudiced by the introduction of his uncharged prior criminal conduct
to rebut his general claim of probity. It seems the equities favor exclusion. The explanation for the courts' increased willingness to allow ad207.
208.
209.
210.

See FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 608(b); C. McCoRmIcK, supra note 2, § 190.
See notes 223-24 infra.
See generally J. WIGMOR., supra note 2, § 1002.
See note 222 infra.

DUKE LAW JOUR4L

[Vol. 1982:61

mission of such evidence probably lies in a subtly changed view of the
criminal justice system. 21n In balancing the competing interests of allowing the jury to hear more facts and of protecting the accused from
police misconduct in obtaining those facts, courts now place more
weight on the "integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal
trial." 2 12

There is good reason to view this development as an improvement
in the administration of justice in our courts. Wigmore's statement of
the collateral-matter test 213 is too rigid. Courts have had to ignore or
bend the rule to permit extrinsic contradiction of linchpin facts or to
avoid excluding potentially crucial impeachment evidence. To avoid
injustice, they have stretched the doctrines of curative admissibility and
impeaching character "placed in issue" beyond recognizable limits.
The use of Wigmore's formulation of the rule has thus forced the courts
to break other evidentiary rules.
By adopting the sweeping-claim-on-direct exception, an impressive majority of state courts 214 have demonstrated the importance of
the exception to the truth-seeking function of trials. The laudable policies reflected in the collateral-matter rule should be subordinated to
that function when a gratuitous sweeping claim can be quickly unmasked as false. When the prosecutor elicits the falsehood during
cross-examination, however, the courts still adhere to the collateralmatter rule. The defendant may not use the constitutional exclusionary
rule or the collateral-matter rule to perjure with impunity, but the prosecutor may not evade these same rules simply by asking questions that
touch on inadmissible evidence. The sweeping-claims exception is necessary to curb testimonial abuses by witnesses, butAgnello and the collateral-matter rule are necessary to curb prosecutorial abuses.
211. See Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the Defendant's 'Right" to Testify, 18
Am. CraM. L. Rav. 419 (1981). See note 206 supra.
212. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980).
213. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
214. The author has found only one out of the twenty-one states cited in note 1supra that has
flatly rejected the sweeping-claims exception. In McClelland v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 145, 267 N.W.2d
843 (1978), the defendant testified on direct examination that he had not been involved in any
criminal activity since 1972. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in
allowing the prosecutor to rebut the sweeping statement with evidence that the defendant had
been involved in an armed burglary five days after the robbery for which he was on trial. The
majority held that the collateral-matter rule prohibited the impeachment. Id at 160-62, 267
N.W.2d at 850-51. The dissent, citing Walder and Harris,argued that the defendant opened the
door to impeachment with his sweeping denial on direct. Id at 163-65, 267 N.W.2d at 851-52.
See also State v. Spraggins, 71 Wis. 2d 604, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1976).
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in dicta, rejected the exception in State v. Larson, 253
N.W.2d 433, 436 (N.D. 1977), but Larson focused on the false statement made by a witness on
cross-examination.
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The Federal Rules of Evidence attempt to eliminate false and mis-

leading testimony without creating a process that is unfair and unduly
time-consuming. Rule 102 explains: "These rules shall be construed to

secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined. '' 21 5 A careful consideration of this language leads
one to conclude that the sweeping-claims exception is consistent with
its message, and that the courts should not use Havens to undermine
Agnello and the collateral-matter rule. But the hortatory language of

rule 102 is insufficient guidance for the trial courts in the areas of extrinsic impeachment by contradiction, the collateral-matter rule, and

the sweeping-claims exception. Because the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not speak expressly of these doctrines, the courts must navigate in
relatively uncharted seas. Only rule 608(b) purports to guide them in

their rulings on collateral impeachment with extrinsic evidence of prior
misconduct, and rule 608(b) is a misleading guidepost. Thus, the state
and federal courts that implement the rules are in disarray. The rules
should be amended to provide more guidance to these courts.
A. A ProposedAmendment to FederalRule 607.
The Federal Rules of Evidence should codify the doctrine that cer-

tain attacks on credibility are not collateral and may be conducted with
extrinsic testimony. Evidence demonstrating the bias of a witness may
be the prime example, 216 but the rules should also specifically permit
other noncollateral modes of attack on the credibility of a witness. In
drafting a list of the permissible methods of impeaching the credibility
215. FED.R. EVID. 102.
216. See, eg., United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979) (the pendency of a criminal
prosecution against prosecution witness), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1976) (government witness had accused defendant of fathering her
illegitimate child and had vowed revenge); United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1976)
(government witnesses made threats against defendants), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977); Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975) (prosecution's witness-informer had "framed" a previous defendant in a similar case); United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(government informer-witness was a drug addict while working as a police operative); United
States v. Haggett, 438 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.) (the prosecution witness had stated that he was "out to
get" defendant), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 (1971); Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856, 568 S.W.2d 3
(1978) (prosecution witness threatened to retaliate if defendant did not become an informer); State
v. Jones, 25 Wash. App. 746, 610 P.2d 931 (1980) (government witness threatened to "fry" the
defendant with his testimony). Cf.United States v. Moore, 529 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (failure
of defense counsel to introduce evidence that prosecution witness was having an affair with defendant's wife because counsel may have believed it to be a "collateral" issue); Reichenbach v.
Smith, 528 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusal to allow one of the losing defendants to introduce
evidence of a secret argument between the plaintiff and a codefendant was not prejudicial error).
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of witnesses, proponents of such an amendment should use as models
the California Evidence Code,217 Florida's adaptation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 218 and the proposed Texas evidence code. 219 Like
the California code and the proposed Texas code, the listing need not
be exclusive. A witness may be impeached in innumerable ways; any
217. CAL. EVID. CODE § 780 (West 1966) states:
Generalrule as to credibility. Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury
may consider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing,
including but not limited to any of the following:
(a) His demeanor while testifying ....
(b) The character of his testimony.
(c) The extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matter about which he testifies.
(d) The extent of his opportunity to perceive ....
(e) His character for honesty or veracity or their opposites.
(f) The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive.
(g) A statement previously made by him that is consistent with his testimony at the
hearing.
(h) A statement made by him that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at
the hearing.
(i) The existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by him.
(j) His attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the giving of
testimony.
(k) His admissions of untruthfulness.
218. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608 (West 1979) provides in relevant part:
Who may impeach
(1) Any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by:
(a) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his present
testimony.
(b) Showing that the witness is biased.
(c) Attacking the character of the witness in accordance with the provisions of
§ 90.609 or § 90.610.
(d) Showing a defect of capacity, ability or opportunity in the witness to observe,
remember, or recount the matters about which he testified.
(e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness
being impeached.
219. The proposed Texas rule reads:
Rule 607
IMPEACHMENT GENERALLY
(a) The credibility of a witness may be attacked by the opposing party by proof of
bias, interest, inconsistent statements, traits of character affecting credibility, any impairment or disability affecting credibility, or by any other circumstances which the trial
court believes would reasonably affect the credibility of the witness.
(b) A witness may also be impeached by the opposing party by cross-examination
or extrinsic evidence contradicting the witness' testimony on matters directly in issue or
matters affecting the witness' credibility, as provided in these rules, but a witness may not
be impeached by contradiction on collateral matters unless in the opinion of the trial
judge the impeachment evidence gives promise of exposing falsehood or should be admitted in the interests ofjustice.
(c) The credibility of a witness may not be attacked by the party placing him on
the stand or by a party with like interests without a showing that such witness' testimony
is injurious to said party's cause and that the nature of the witness' testimony surprised
said party, and in.no event may such party offer evidence of such witness' bad character.
Black, 1he Texas Rules of Evidence-A ProposedCodocaiion, 31 Sw. L.J. 969, 985 (1977).
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attempt to state all methods of impeachment is bound to fail. 220

Drafters of the amendment must try to avoid the danger22that the

codified collateral-matter rule may be enforced too strictly. ' Most
treatise writers recommend that trial courts be given more flexibility in
admitting or excluding extrinsic evidence that impeaches a witness on a
strictly collateral point.2 22 This result would, in effect, validate the way

in which many courts presently handle extrinsic contradiction when it

runs afoul of the collateral-matter rule.2 23 Leaving the matter in the

220. The Florida code apparently attempts an exhaustive list, see note 218 supra, yet it omits
the form of impeachment involving proof of lack of qualifications or skills of an expert witness.
See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 991, 1005.
221. The California Law Revision Committee voiced this concern when it considered adopting the Uniform Rules of Evidence which, in effect, eliminate the strict prohibition on collateral
impeachment in favor of a rule of discretion. See 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, A STUDY
RELATING TO THE WITNESSES, in REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 725, 750 (1964).
As a result, section 780(i) of the California Code, see note 217, states that the existence or nonexistence of "any" fact, as opposed to a "material" fact, may be shown to discredit a witness. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(e) (West 1979) (reproduced in note 218 supra).
222. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 71, § 129; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 153, 607[05]; J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1003, 1005. The comment to rule 106 of
the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence observes:
The balance which should be struck between the value of any item of evidence affecting
credibility and these risks [unfair surprise, undue consumption of time, confusion of issues, and illegitimate prejudice] as they appear at a trial is to be determined by the
exercise of a sound judgment, and the judge' is in an especially favorable position to
exercise it. He should not be bound by rules of thumb ....
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106, Comments, at 119 (1942).
223. "The cases dealing with discretion in the field of contradiction seem to go further than
[this] text. Some imply that the trial judge has discretion to decide what is and is not collateral
.... Others suggest that even if collateral the judge has a discretion to permit the contradiction." C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 47, at 100 n.58; e.g., United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d
675, 682 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The doctrine of Walder .... as preserved in [Federal Rule of Evidence]
607, gives a trial judge discretion to admit otherwise inadmissible extrinsic evidence tending to
contradict any specific testimony volunteered to by a witness on direct examination"); United
States v. Batts (Batts II), 573 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.) ("It must also be remembered that the
admissibility of rebuttal evidence is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court"), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 859 (1978). United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Once a
witness (especially a defendant-witness) testifies as to any specific fact on direct testimony, the trial
judge has broad discretion to admit extrinsic evidence tending to contradict the specific statement,
even if such statement concerns a collateral matter in the case"); United States v. Alvarez-Lopez,
559 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[Ilmpeachment upon collateral matters may be particularly
subject to potential abuse, and in those situations, [the federal rules] . . . give substantial discretion to the trial court in admitting or excluding the impeaching evidence"); State v. Davis, 117
Ariz. 5, 7, 570 P.2d 776, 778 (Ariz. App. 1977) ("The admission or exclusion of testimony as to
immaterial or collateral materials for the purpose of impeachment is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court"); State v. McCrillis, 376 A.2d 95, 98 (Me. 1977) ("It is well-settled that the presiding Justice has discretion to exclude evidence calculated to impeach, or contradict, testimony first
elicited ... during cross-examination as to matters which are collateral. . ."); Allen v. State, 94
Nev. 285, 286, 579 P.2d 771, 772 (1978) ("Although appellant was impeached as to collateral
matters, we believe '[t]he impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the
jury in assessing [appellant's] credibility.. . .' Thus, the evidence was more probative than prejudicial and, therefore, was properly admitted" (citations omitted)).
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hands of the trial judge makes sense, for he is in the best position to
weigh the competing interests. 224 The trial judge can best determine if
the testimony to be impeached is a deliberate falsehood injected into
the trial by the witness to gain an unfair advantage over his opponent,
or whether it is the result of a good faith error or mistake.
The trial judge is also in the best position to demand an offer of
proof from the party seeking to impeach 225 and he can thereby determine whether the proffered evidence squarely contradicts prior testimony, or only tangentially casts doubt on it; whether the contradiction
will be quick and efficient, or will entail the testimony of many witnesses; whether the contradiction will engender a spate of witnesses
called to rebut the rebuttal; and, most importantly, whether the credibility of the witness to be impeached is the keystone of one party's case,
and the extent to which the fact finder would be left with a false picture
of the crucial witness's credibility without hearing the contradiction.
Furthermore, if a prosecutor seeks to contradict a criminal defendant
with evidence of his prior criminal acts not resulting in a conviction,
the trial court can best assess the added prejudice, and the circumstances under which the matter was originally introduced. Therefore,
the rule must be drafted to make the considerations of rule 403 paramount to a mere determination of whether the impeaching evidence
goes to a collateral or a noncollateral fact.
Because rule 607 initiates the topic of impeachment of witnesses in
Article VI,226 it is logical to list the permitted forms of impeachment in

an amendment to that rule. The following proposal meets the need for
an explicit statement of the collateral-matter rule in the Federal Rules
of Evidence:
Rule 607
Impeachment
(a) Generally. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him, 227 either on cross-examination or by extrinsic testimony, by proof
(1) of bias, interest, or other motive; 228
224. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106, Comments (1942), supra note 222. "[Some]
courts are content to invoke simply the term collateral and to decide according to the circumstances of each case. The sound rule would be to leave the application of the rule largely in the
control of the trial court; and this is the flexible practice in some jurisdictions today." J. Wio-

MORE, supra note 2, § 1003, at 962-64 (footnote omitted).
225. See FED. R. EvD. 103, 104.

226. See text accompanying notes 151-53 supra.
227. This wording is presently used in rule 607.
228. This language is taken from CAL. EVID. CODE § 780()

section is set out in note 217 supra.

(vest

1966). The text of this
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(2) of an inability of the witness to observe, remember,
or re229
count the matter about which he testified;
(3) in accordance with Rule 613, that prior statements of the
witness being impeached concerning material facts
are in230
consistent with the witness's present testimony;
(4) of traits of character as provided by Rules 608 and 609;231
(5) that material facts
are not as testified to by the witness be232
ing impeached;
(6) of any other circumstance that, after due consideration of
the provisions of Rule 403, the court determines
would
2 33
reasonably affect the credibility of the witness.
(b) Extrinsic impeachment of immaterialfact. A witness's testimony regarding immaterial facts may not be contradicted with
extrinsic evidence unless the court determines that
(1) the probative value of the impeaching evidence outweighs
the dangers listed in Rule 403; and
229. This portion of the proposed rule is a modified version of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(d)

(West 1979). The text of this section is reproduced in note 218 supra. The Florida statute speaks
in terms of "a defect of capacity in the witness." It was intended, no doubt, that the term "defect
of capacity" cover both a lack of opportunity to observe, implying an inability to observe resulting
from external causes, as well as a lack of capacity to observe, which connotes a subjective cause of
the perception problem. The term "inability" better conveys the dual possibilities that both objective and subjective factors can limit perception.
230. ccord FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(a) (West 1979). This formulation is essentially the
same except that a reference to rule 613 was thought appropriate because that rule mandates a
certain foundation before extrinsic proof may be offered. The addition of the word "material" to
the proposed clause further limits impeachment by inconsistent statements. This addition recognizes that the collateral-matter rule applies to impeachment by contradiction with prior inconsistent statements. Thus, extrinsic proof is limited to statements concerning material facts. See J.
WIoMoan, supra note 2, § 1019.
231. Once a witness, as the courts misleadingly phrase it, has "put his character in issue," the
credibility of the witness may be attacked by proof that he has an untruthful character. FED. R.
EviD. 404(a)(3), 608(a); C. McCoidvscK, supra note 2, § 41. The proposed rule 607(a)(4) states
this proposition and refers the reader to rules 608 and 609, which govern this type of
impeachment.
232. This provision is substantially the same as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(e) (West 1979),
except that the words "proof by other witnesses" are omitted. Florida's inclusion of these words
only in subsection (e), and not in any of the other four provisions governing how a witness may be
impeached can be misinterpreted to mean that extrinsic evidence is permitted only to contradict a
witness on material, noncollateral facts, and not to show, under subsection (a), that a witness is
biased, or under subsection (d), that he had a defect in his capacity to observe. To avoid this
possible confusion, the proposed rule 607(a) states that extrinsic evidence may be offered to prove
all of the matters listed in this subsection. See J. WiGMoE, supra note 2, § 1005.
233. This catch-all provision, like section 780 of the California Code, see note 217 supra, and
the proposed Texas version of rule 607, see note 219 supra, from which the language is taken,
recognizes that it is unwise to attempt to write an exclusive list of impeaching methods. The
proposed rule specifically adds that any other method of attacking credibility, such as by proof of
prior failures to exercise skill on the part of an expert witness, see J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§§ 991, 1005, or by drawing attention to the witness's demeanor or to the character of his testimony, see CAL. EvID. CODE § 780(a)-(b) (West 1966), is permitted only after the trial judge has
determined that rule 403 allows these kinds of attacks.
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(2) the impeaching evidence is likely to expose false testimony

initially elicited during direct examination of the witness
or volunteered by the witness on crossbeing impeached, 234
examination; and
2 35
(3) the interests of justice require its admission.

The format of the proposed rule is suggested by Florida's version
of Federal Rule 607.236 Both rules state who may impeach a witness
and then list the modes of impeachment as subsections. The subsections of section (a) of the proposed rule plainly provide that extrinsic
evidence may be admitted to prove bias, lack of opportunity or capacity to observe, recollect or communicate, and conviction of a crime.
These are noncollateral matters under the traditional rule because the
evidence does more than simply raise a contradiction between

testimonies.
The proposed rule permits the extrinsic impeachment of testimony
concerning linchpin facts. If a court views a linchpin fact as collateral
because it does not meet Wigmore's strict test, and the witness to be
impeached did not raise the fact, the impeachment still may be permitted under proposed rule 607(a)(6). This catch-all provision is designed

to permit trial courts to use their discretion to escape the rigors of the
collateral-matter rule.
Subsection (b) delineates the sweeping-claims exception to the col-

lateral-matter rule. The proposal provides that a party who seeks to
introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness on an "immaterial ' ' 2 7 point must surmount three obstacles. First, the proponent of
the evidence must convince the court that the value of the rebuttal is

greater than the dangers of prejudice, time wasting, and jury confusion.
If no further prerequisites were imposed, evidence offered under the
234. Compare this formulation with Professor Black's proposed Texas rule 607(b), note 219
supra.
235. Professor Black suggested this language.
236. See note 218 supra.
237. The word "collateral" has been avoided purposefully. It has been justly criticized. "The
value adjective 'collateral' hides more than it reveals." 2 D. LouIsELL & C. MUELLER, supra note
71, § 129, at 49. "[It] tends both to conceal the analytical process, and to hide the reality of the
discretionary factor." Id at 67. Except for the title to subsection four of rule 1004, the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not use the words "collateral" or "noncollateral." Thus, it was thought wise
not to introduce the term here. The Federal Rules of Evidence have abandoned the term "material" as "looselyused and ambiguous." See Advisory Committee's note to FED. R. EVID. 401. In
its place, the rules use the words "of consequence to the determination of the action." FED. R.
EviD. 401. Even if this phrase is an improvement, it is not used in the proposed revisions of rule
607 because it makes the language cumbersome. And so long as the reader knows that "material"
means "of consequence to the determination of the action," there is no good reason, aside from a
slavish desire for consistency, to jettison a word that has been part of the definition of the collateral-matter rule for generations.
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exception would always be admissible under subsection (a)(6) of the
proposed rule regardless of when and how the matter was raised at

trial. However, when the mode of impeachment is by contradiction on
a collateral point with other testimony, subsection (b)(2) requires that
the matter be first raised on direct examination or volunteered on crossexamination. In effect, the witness must invite impeachment by his

own testimony, and in such a manner as to violate our basic notions of
fair play. The judge must be convinced that the testimony to be impeached is a knowing fabrication and that the rebuttal evidence is

likely to expose it. Subsection (b)(3) may seem redundant, but it captures the essence of the sweeping-claims exception-to ensure the in2 38
tegrity of a trial's truth-seeking function.

B. A ProposedAmendment to FederalRule of Evidence 608.
239
The cases show that courts tend to read rule 608(b) too broadly.

Often they view it as prohibiting all impeachment with extrinsic evidence of specific misconduct not resulting in a conviction. 240 Of course,
this view conflicts with the collateral-impeachment rule, which allows
impeachment with evidence of misconduct that demonstrates bias, lack
of perception, and so forth. Redrafting rule 608 as suggested should

solve this continuing problem by clarifying the narrow area of the
rule's application. The reworded 608(b) emphasizes that extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct is prohibited only when the con-

duct is offered as circumstantial evidence of a witness's character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, Le., to show that the witness generally is

an untrustworthy person who should not be believed. 241

238. See, eg., United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa.), aj'd,588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.
1978). In Salvitti the defendant, a city official charged with taking a bribe, testified he had never
received any money in envelopes and presented a large number of character witnesses. The court
permitted the prosecutor to rebut this testimony with evidence of an uncharged bribe, stating,
"[defendant] plainly sought to convey to the jury. . . that [he] was an honorable public servant
who had never received a bribe," 451 F. Supp. at 203, and that in this setting it would have been
"decidedly unfair" to the Government to exclude the rebuttal testimony. Id at 205. In United
States v. Batts (Batts II), 573 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978), the court,
affirming a conviction, noted, "[b]y admitting the rebuttal evidence, the trial court merely permitted completion of the [previously mispainted] picture as to appellant's true involvement and
knowledge in the drug world and thereby corrected a distorted view of appellant's testimony and
his attempts to portray naivety."
239. See notes 135-48 supra and accompanying text.
240. Cf.United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718-19 (4th Cir. 1981) (trial court erroneously
read rule 608(b) as prohibiting cross-examination concerning the witness's prior fraudulent conduct not resulting in a conviction).
241. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 47, at 15 n.57 (Supp. 1978). Rule 404(b) also prohibits the other impermissible use of prior-bad-acts evidence: to prove that the actor has a propensity
to act in a certain manner and, thus, as alleged, that he probably acted again in that way.
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Redrafting rule 608(b) also affords an opportunity to correct the
illogical sequence of its two sentences. Normally, the witness being impeached is cross-examined before the opponent attempts to introduce
extrinsic impeaching evidence. Therefore, the rule should first address
cross-examination of the witness being attacked. The following proposed rule 608(b) fulfills both of these purposes:
Rule 608
Evidence of the Character of a Witness 242
(a) Opinion andreputation evidence of character.
(b) Specftc instances of conduct. In the discretion of the court, spe-

cific instances of conduct, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, may be inquired into on cross-examination of a
witness
(1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
or
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness about whose character the witness being
cross-examined has testified. Except for conviction of a
crime as provided in Rule 609, specific instances of conduct offered as circumstantial evidence of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When rules 607 and 608(b) as proposed here are read together,
they eliminate the danger that a trial court will exclude contradicting
evidence that also demonstrates the impeached witness's bias or other
noncollateral matters that the rule would prohibit. However, a party's
contradiction of a witness's testimony on a collateral point merely for
the sake of contradiction is not permitted unless the conditions of rule
607(b) are fulfilled.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are not intended to cover every
aspect of the law of evidence. The gaps permit the courts to expand
and improve the rules. However, this article has demonstrated that the
failure of the rules to address collateral contradiction and its exceptions
and the ambiguity of rule 608(b) have created enough confusion in the
courts to warrant the remedies recommended.
242. Arguably, this section's current title, "Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness," is
misleading. It appears to draw a conceptual distinction between the character of witnesses on one
hand, and the conduct of witnesses on the other. But rule 608 intends no such dichotomy. Specific-conduct evidence can be merely a form of character evidence, as is reputation and opinion
testimony. The rule simply prohibits extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness's conduct
when offered as proof of character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See FED. R. EvrD. 608,
Advisory Committee Notes.

